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Abstract
Three Essays in Economics
by
Alex Wood-Doughty
In this dissertation I study a new emerging labor market as well as a very old question
about education. In all three chapters, I collect and build complex datasets and combine
formal theoretical modeling with advanced econometric techniques. This allows me to
answer interesting questions about peer effects in education, as well as employer learning
and competitiveness in online labor markets.
In Chapter 1, Richard Startz and I propose an improved estimator of peer effects using
network data. The ability to estimate peer effects in network models has been advanced
considerably by the IV model of Bramoulle´, Djebbari and Fortin (2009). While such IV
estimates work well for very sparse networks, they exhibit very weak power for networks
of even modest densities. We review and extend the findings of Bramoulle´, Djebbari and
Fortin (2009) and then propose an alternative estimator. We show that our new estimator
works approximately as well as IV in very sparse networks and performs much better in
networks of moderate density. To highlight the benefits of our proposed estimator, we
provide an empirical application where we estimate peer effects in individual schools.
In Chapter 2, I study whether employers learn from public, subjective, performance
reviews. Much of the new “gig economy” relies on reputation systems to reduce prob-
lems of asymmetric information. In most cases, these reputation systems function well
by soliciting unbiased feedback from buyers and sellers. However, certain features of
online labor markets create incentives for employers to misreport worker performance.
This paper tests whether employers learn about worker productivity from public, subjec-
vi
tive, performance reviews using data from a large online labor market. Starting with a
simple model of employer learning in the presence of potentially biased reviews, I derive
testable hypotheses about the relationship between public information and wages, worker
attrition, and contract renewals. I find that these public reviews provide substantial in-
formation to the market and that other firms use them to learn about the productivity
of workers. I also find evidence that these reviews affect how long workers stay in the
labor market. Finally, using data on applications, I provide evidence of a mechanism
for informative reviews. I show that workers punish firms that leave negative reviews by
refusing to work for them again. Together, this body of evidence suggests that reputation
systems in online labor markets provide significant information to both workers and firms
and help reduce problems of asymmetric information.
In Chapter 3, I analyze the competitiveness of online labor markets. A number of new
labor market innovations have promised a more competitive marketplace. This paper
tests this claim by comparing an online labor market with traditional labor markets.
First, using data from an online labor market, I estimate a two-way fixed effects model
and compare my estimates to the existing literature on traditional labor markets. Then,
using a model of imperfect competition, I relate the estimated employer-specific wage
premiums with the structural parameters governing market competitiveness. Combined
with reasonable assumptions about differences in these labor markets, I show that the
estimated differences in the variance of employer-specific wage premiums imply differences
in competitiveness. My results suggest that online labor markets are more competitive
than traditional labor markets.
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Chapter 1
Improved Estimation of Peer Effects
using Network Data
1.1 Introduction
Estimation of peer effects in networks has undergone enormous growth. Much of
this growth is due to the breakthrough work of Bramoulle´, Djebbari and Fortin (2009)
(hereafter BDF) who show that if we know the network structure–who interacts with
whom–and there is enough sparsity of the network, peer effects are identified. Much
of the peer-effect literature is framed in the Manski (1993) linear-in-means framework,
i.e. my outcome depends linearly on the average outcomes of my friends. Manski shows
that, without knowing anything about the group structure, the linear-in-means model
is not identified. BDF make two contributions. First, they show that the additional
information available from knowing the structure of network interactions often permits
identification. Second, they offer an instrumental variable strategy for estimating such
models.
While BDF prove that identification holds for almost all networks, their simulations
1
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show that meaningful inference is only possible in very sparse networks. For networks
with density above 5%, (the average person is connected with 5% of the network), their
instrumental variables estimation offers very limited power. Our primary contribution is
to offer a nonlinear estimator that we show has enormously improved power in denser
networks with only a small departure from nominal size. We also extend and confirm
BDF’s Monte Carlo results on bias and precision, and further frame the issues in the
weak instrument framework. (See Nelson and Startz (1990a,b) and Staiger and Stock
(1997))
Much of the practical concern about network density arises in the study of friendship
networks in school, which are typically relatively dense within a classroom or a single
school. BDF use their technique to identify peer effects of recreational activities by middle
and high-schoolers. Their technique has also been used in a number of other papers:
De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010) look at peer effects in college major choice, Lin
(2010) looks at academic achievement, and Fortin and Yazbeck (2015) look at obesity.
Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009) use a similar method to investigate peer
effects in school performance. All of these studies use data on the friendship networks in
schools to identify the peer effects.
While some schools are sufficiently large to ensure a low density friendship network,
there are many with densities above 5%. To get around this problem, the previous studies
generate a sparse network by stacking multiple school networks and assuming there is
no interaction across schools. To illustrate the increased power of our proposed method,
we give an empirical example in which we identify peer effects without stacking across
schools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the linear-in-means
model and explains the common method of estimating peer effects. Section 3 provides
some Monte Carlo simulations that highlight the problems with the common method
2
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for higher density networks. Section 4 proposes an alternative estimation strategy and
Section 5 provides simulations that highlight its benefits. Section 6 applies the new
method to the Add Health data and estimates school-level peer effects.
1.2 Linear-in-Means Model
Consider the following model, taken from BDF:
yi = α + β
1
ni
∑
j∈gi
yj + γxi + δ
1
ni
∑
j∈gi
xj + i (1.1)
i|X ∼ iidN(0, σ2 )
where gi is the set of friends of person i and ni is the size of gi. We model person i’s
outcome, yi, as a simple average of her friends’ outcomes, yj, an observable characteris-
tic, xi, and an average of her friends’ observable characteristics, xj. Following Manski
(1993), we will call β the endogenous social effect and δ the exogenous social effect. The
endogenous social effect, or peer effect, can be interpreted as the relationship between
an average friend’s outcome and your outcome. In a classroom setting, we might be
interested in the peer effect of test scores: how your average friend’s test score affects
your own score. We assume |β| < 1, as is standard. The exogenous social effect mea-
sures the influence of your friends’ characteristics on your outcome. If we believe that
the education level of a student’s parents affects their achievement in the classroom, we
might also believe the education level of their friends’ parents has an effect. Importantly,
we want to separately identify the endogenous social effect from the exogenous effect.
They are both capturing the influence of peers, however they have very different policy
implications. In particular, in many situations the endogenous social effect creates a
multiplier on changes in the exogenous variables.
3
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Following BDF, we can stack the observations and write the model as:
Y = αι+ βGY + γX + δGX + E (1.2)
E|X ∼ N(0, σ2EIn)
where G is the adjacency matrix, a row-normalized n × n matrix that describes the
network and ι is an n × 1 vector of ones. The adjacency matrix starts as a matrix of
ones and zeros where Gij = 1 if i is friends with j. Each row is then normalized by its
sum so both the endogenous and exogenous social effects can be interpreted as the effect
of an average friend. Since this is a simultaneous system, in order to separately identify
both β and δ we need an instrument. To see this, we can rewrite Equation 1.2 to give
the reduced form by collecting terms on Y :
Y = αι+ βGY + γX + δGX + E
= (In − βG)−1(αι+ γX + δGX + E) (1.3)
4
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We can write (In − βG)−1 as a series expansion,
∞∑
k=0
βkGk, so:
Y =
∞∑
k=0
βkGk(αι+ γX + δGX + E) (1.4)
=
∞∑
k=0
βkGk(γX + δGX) +
∞∑
k=0
βkGk(αι+ E) (1.5)
= γX +
∞∑
k=1
βkGkγX +
∞∑
k=0
βkGkδGX +
∞∑
k=0
βkGk(αι+ E) (1.6)
= γX +
∞∑
k=1
βkGkγX +
∞∑
k=1
βk−1GkδX +
∞∑
k=0
βkGk(αι+ E) (1.7)
= γX +
∞∑
k=1
(βkγ + βk−1δ)GkX +
∞∑
k=0
βkGk(αι+ E) (1.8)
= γX +
∞∑
k=1
βk−1(βγ + δ)GkX +
∞∑
k=0
βkGk(αι+ E) (1.9)
= γX + (βγ + δ)GX + β(βγ + δ)GGX +
∞∑
k=3
βk−1(βγ + δ)GkX +
α
1− β ι+
∞∑
k=0
βkGkE
(1.10)
If we only use information on X and GX, we cannot separately identify [α, β, γ, δ].
However, since GGX does not show up directly in Equation 1.2 but it does show up in
the reduced form of GY , BDF propose that the characteristics of the friends of friends
(GGX) can be used to instrument for the friends’ outcomes, GY , and Equation 1.2 can
be estimated via 2SLS. The structural parameters are identified as long as GGX is not
perfectly collinear with ι, X, and GX.1 Another way of saying this is that there must
be some intransitive triads: second-order friends who are not also first-order friends.
The instrument must be providing some information about GY . While this is true for
most networks, the amount of information decreases as the network gets more dense.
1Generally, for any p > 1, GpX is a valid instrument for GY as long as GpX is not perfectly collinear
with [ι, X, GX].
5
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As everyone has more friends, everyone’s second-order friends start to look more and
more similar. We show below that “weak identification” in this context results in biased
standard errors but only modestly biased coefficients. In other words, the classical IV
asymptotic distributions are about right although the estimated distributions are not.
The more important issue, correctly identified by the asymptotic distributions, is that
the estimator is of very low power.
1.2.1 Estimation
Once we have an instrument, estimation proceeds via 2SLS.2 Following BDF, we
assume there are network-specific unobservables, α. To control for these unobservable
characteristics, we apply a within-transformation by multiplying each term by In− 1n(ιι′).
Note, that this transformation changes the identification requirement slightly. As proven
in BDF, now the structural parameters are identified as long as GGGX is not perfectly
collinear with [X,GX,GGX].
Define the following:
R = In − 1
n
(ιι′) (1.11)
W = [RGY,RX,RGX] (1.12)
Z = [RX,RGX,RGGX] (1.13)
P = Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′ (1.14)
θ = [β, γ, δ]′ (1.15)
2Lee, Liu and Lin (2010) adopted spatial models to allow estimation via maximum likelihood. They
show their method is more efficient than 2SLS, however they are still relying on variation in GGX for
identification.
6
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Then the 2SLS estimator is:
θˆ2SLS = (W
′PW )−1W ′PRY (1.16)
and the asymptotic variance is:
V ar(θˆ2SLS) = σ
2
E(W
′PW )−1 (1.17)
where σ2 is estimated by
σˆE2 =
1
n
((RY −Wθˆ)′(RY −Wθˆ)) (1.18)
1.3 2SLS Simulation Results
To examine the properties of this estimator, we run Monte Carlo simulations. We
generate data from known parameters and then estimate the model in an attempt to
recover those parameters. We will vary the density of the network to see how that affects
the estimation. We follow BDF by setting the network size, N = 240, α = 0.7683,
β = 0.4666, γ = 0.0834 and δ = 0.1507. We draw X from a log-normal distribution with
mean 1 and variance 3. For each simulation, we generate a random reciprocal network
with the probability of any link equal to the density. We then row normalize so the weight
on each individual’s friends sums to 1. We also draw the error vector, E ∼ N(0, 0.1).
From there, we can generate the outcome Y according to Equation 1.3. We simulate
10,000 networks with each of the following densities: 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3.
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of the estimated βˆs. As in the BDF findings, the
estimates become imprecise around a density of 5% and there is no meaningful inference
for dense networks, in that the distributions become essentially flat. Note also some
7
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increase in bias as the density increases.
We are mainly interested in inference about βˆ, so we construct the following test
statistic: tβˆ =
βˆ−0.4666
SEβˆ
and compare the statistic to a 5 percent critical value. Figure 1.2
plots the empirical size of this test. At very low densities, the test achieves approximately
the correct size. However, in more dense networks the test is notably undersized.
Figure 1.1: Distribution of βˆ for varying network
densities Figure 1.2: Size of βˆ for varying network densities
To test the power, we let the true β vary uniformly between [0, 1] and then test
the hypothesis that βˆ = 0.4666. Figure 1.3 plots the power of the test at the specified
densities.
Even for the 5% network there is limited power. For densities of 10% or larger, power
effectively equals size, meaning there is no information in the test statistic. To investigate
the cause of this low power, we look at the first stage regression:
RGY = pi1RX + pi2RGX + pi3RGGX + V (1.19)
Figure 1.4 plots the median F-statistic for the coefficient on the instrument, pi3. This
shows that the instrument is very weak for the 5% density network and closely mirrors
Figure 1.3.
8
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Figure 1.3: Power
The normal cause of a weak instrument problem is that the chosen instrument is only
slightly correlated with the endogenous variable (Nelson and Startz, 1990a). Here, the
reason the instrument is so weak is because GGX is highly collinear with [ι,X,GX].
Figure 1.5 plots the log of the median condition number for W ′PW . The condition
number is a measure of collinearity, and numbers above 3.4 (log(30)) are evidence of
high multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). Here we can clearly see the
relationship between collinearity, the weak instrument, and the lack of power of the
estimates. The reason we are getting weak identification for higher density networks is
because GGX is not providing much new information.
1.3.1 Anderson-Rubin Test
To further investigate the weak instrument hypothesis, we can run an Anderson-Rubin
(1949) test, which should have exact finite sample size up to Monte Carlo error. Figure
1.6a plots the size of the Anderson-Rubin test. As expected the test has the proper
5% size across all densities. Figure 1.6b plots the power of the Anderson-Rubin test by
varying the true β uniformly between [0, 1] and setting β0 = 0.4666. This shows the well
9
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Figure 1.4: First Stage F-Statistic
known fact that the Anderson-Rubin test has limited power. However, a comparison
to Figure 1.3 shows that the power of the Anderson-Rubin test is not much worse than
the power of 2SLS. This, together with the multicollinearity results, suggests that the
difficulties with instrumental variable inference in denser networks reflect low information
content rather than a failure of the usual asymptotic approximations.
1.3.2 Size with True Error Variance
To investigate the causes of the test being undersized, we recompute the standard
errors using the true error variance, σ2, in place of the estimated error variance. Figure 1.7
plots the size of the test for both standard 2SLS and using the true σ2. When we use the
true error variance, the test has proper size, suggesting that the reason 2SLS is undersized
is that it is overestimating the error variance. Thus the asymptotic distribution gives a
good approximation to the empirical distribution with N = 240.
10
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Figure 1.5: Log Condition Number
1.3.3 Other Sample Sizes and Number of Variables
While choosing n = 240 and a single covariate is consistent with BDF, we might
also be interested in the behavior of the estimator in different situations. In particular,
we might like to know how it performs in larger samples and with a more realistic set
of covariates. To illustrate this, we run simulations with n = 1000 and with simulated
covariates that are similar to the empirical application of BDF.3 Figure 1.8 shows the
results for the three sparse denisities (1%, 2.5%, 5%). There is a marked decline in power
when including a number of other covariates, as well as increasing the sample size. This
suggests that the performance of the 2SLS estimator depends on more than just the
density of the network, and that for empirical applications, even a 1% density network
may not be enough to guarantee reasonable power.
3We simulate the covariates to approximate the summary statistics in Table 1.1.
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(a) Size (b) Power
Figure 1.6: Anderson-Rubin Test
1.4 Alternative Estimation Strategy (Residual Se-
ries Expansion Estimation)
As seen in the previous section, any estimation strategy that relies on variation in
GGX will have difficulty with dense networks. To avoid this, we exploit another part of
Equation 1.10 to identify β:
Y = γX + (βγ + δ)GX + β(βγ + δ)GGX
+
∞∑
k=3
βk−1(βγ + δ)GkX +
α
1− β ι+
∞∑
k=0
βkGkE
= γX + (βγ + δ)GX + β(βγ + δ)GGX (1.20)
+
∞∑
k=3
βk−1(βγ + δ)GkX +
α
1− β ι
+ E + βGE + β2G2E +
∞∑
k=3
βkGkE
Notice that β shows up in the series expansion of the error term. The goal of our
strategy is to estimate β from this series expansion. To do this, we must first get a good
12
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Figure 1.7: Size with True Error Variance
approximation of the error term. Since E is uncorrelated with X, the regression of Y on
[ι,X,GX,GGX] will generate the best linear predictor of Y .4 As we have already seen,
the omitted higher order terms are highly correlated with the included terms. Because
the higher order terms are projected onto the included terms, and also because powers
of β fade toward zero, the residuals will approximate the series expansion with E .
Y = λ0ι+ λ1X + λ2GX + λ3GGX + η (1.21)
e = Y − Yˆ =
∞∑
k=3
βk−1(βγ + δ)(GkX − µ0k −
3∑
l=1
µlkG
l−1X) (1.22)
+ E + βGE + β2GGE +
∞∑
k=3
βkGkE
≈ E + βGE + β2GGE +
∞∑
k=3
βkGkE (1.23)
where the µ coefficients come from the projection of the higher order terms onto the
4Any subset of GpX will also work, see Subsection 1.4.1
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Figure 1.8: Power with different n and k
included terms,
∀k ∈ {3, . . . ,∞} GkX = µ0kι+ µ1kX + µ2kGX + µ3kGGX + ν (1.24)
The key for recovering a good approximation of Equation 1.23 is that the omitted higher
order terms are well approximated by the included terms, in other words, that the R2 of
each Equation 1.24 is high.
Multiplying Equation 1.23 by G gives,
Ge ≈ GE + βGGE + β2GGGE +
∞∑
k=3
βkGk+1E (1.25)
and by combining Equations 1.23 and 1.25 we can write,
e = βGe+ E (1.26)
14
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The least squares estimator of β in Equation 1.26 is biased since Cov(Ge, E) 6= 0, but
we can explicitly write out the probability limit of the OLS estimator.
plim[βˆOLS] =
Cov(e,Ge)
V ar(Ge)
(1.27)
We evaluate Equation 1.27 by writing out the numerator and denominator and then
taking advantage of the fact that E is the only source of uncertainty and that σ2 cancels
between the numerator and the denominator. This leaves β as the only unknown. After
dropping high-order terms in the expansions we solve numerically for β.
Cov(e,Ge) = Cov
((
E + βGE + β2GGE +
∞∑
k=3
βkGkE
)
,
(
GE + βGGE + β2GGGE +
∞∑
k=3
βkGk+1E
)) (1.28)
=
∞∑
i=1
∞∑
j=1
βi+j−1Cov(GiE , GjE) (1.29)
=
∞∑
k=0
βk
k∑
l=0
Cov(GlE , Gk−l+1E) (1.30)
and
V ar(Ge) = V ar(GE + βGGE + β2GGGE +
∞∑
k=3
βkGk+1E) (1.31)
=
∞∑
i=1
∞∑
j=1
βi+j−2Cov(GiE , GjE) (1.32)
=
∞∑
k=0
βk
k+1∑
l=1
Cov(GlE , Gk−l+2E) (1.33)
Rearranging Equation 1.27 and combining on β, gives us:
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Cov(e,Ge)− plim[βˆOLS]V ar(Ge) = 0
(1.34)
⇒
( ∞∑
k=0
βk
k∑
l=0
Cov(GlE , Gk−l+1E)
)
−
(
plim[βˆOLS]
∞∑
k=0
βk
k+1∑
l=1
Cov(GlE , Gk−l+2E)
)
= 0
(1.35)
⇒
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
k∑
l=0
Cov(GlE , Gk−l+1E)− plim[βˆOLS]
k+1∑
l=1
Cov(GlE , Gk−l+2E)
)
= 0
(1.36)
which is a polynomial with respect to β. Since
Cov(GpE , GqE) ≈
∑
diag(Gp ∗Gq)
N
σ2E (1.37)
we can approximate the polynomial and solve for its root, which will be our estimate of
βˆRSEE. Since Equation 1.36 is an infinite series, we need to choose an expansion point.
Our testing has shown that k = 3 works well in practice, so the formula becomes:
plim[βˆOLS] ≈ β
+
Cov(E , GE) + βCov(E , GGE) + β2Cov(E , GGGE) + β3Cov(E , GGGGE)
V ar(GE) + β2V ar(GGE) + 2β2Cov(GE , GGGE) + 2β4Cov(GGE , GGGGE)
(1.38)
1.4.1 Number of Terms in First-Stage Regression
As previously shown, the goal of the first-stage regression is for the residuals to
approximate the series expansion of E . Because we include a small number of terms
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in Equation 1.21, the residuals might not be a good approximation. However, due to
the collinearity between the various powers of the adjacency matrix, there is not much
new information in the higher order terms. Figure 1.9 plots the squared correlation
coefficient between the residuals and the true series expansion of E for three different
first-stage equations. While only including two terms does worse, especially for low
density networks, there is hardly any difference once we move beyond four terms. The
first-stage equation is doing a very good job of approximating the error term.
Figure 1.9: Comparison of First-Stage Equations
1.4.2 Small Sample Correction
In a finite sample, the first-stage equation may not well approximate the error term.
In particular, this occurs when the sample size is small (n = 240) and there are many
covariates (k = 17). Because of the small sample, one may find a spurious correlation
between the error term and the covariates. This causes some of the error term to be
projected onto the covariates, and the approximation in the first-stage is not as good.
Fortunately, there is an easy fix by including the covariates in the second-stage regression:
17
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e = βGe+λX +µGX + E . Although e is uncorrelated with X and GX by construction,
in a small sample, Ge is not necessarily uncorrelated with X and GX and including
them in the regression improves the estimation. Figure 1.10 shows this improvement
when n = 240 and also highlights that it is unneccesary for larger samples.
Figure 1.10: Small Sample Correction
1.4.3 Standard Error Estimation
Standard errors can be estimated either via the delta method or by the bootstrap.
Notice from Equation 1.38 that we solve βˆOLS = f(β), for some implicit function f .
Therefore βˆRSEE = f
−1(βˆOLS) and we can apply the delta method:
√
n
(
f−1(βˆOLS)− f−1(β)
)
D−→ N
(
0, σ2
βˆOLS
[f−1]′(β)2
)
⇒√n
(
βˆRSEE − β
)
D−→ N
(
0,
σ2
βˆOLS
f ′(β)2
)
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Alternatively, we generate bootstrapped standard errors. For an estimated βˆRSEE,
we construct Y − βˆRSEEGY and regress this on [ι,X,GX]. Since this is no longer a
simultaneous system, we can get estimates of α, γ, and δ via OLS.
Y − βˆRSEEGY = αι+ (β − βˆRSEE)GY + γX + δGX + E (1.39)
From these estimates, we generate residuals.
J =
(
Y − βˆRSEEGY
)
−
(
αˆι+ γˆX + δˆGX
)
(1.40)
We then multiply the residuals by either -1 or 1 and reassign them to a new observation
(with replacement). With the new residuals, we compute a new Yb and then estimate a
new βˆ.
pi ∈ {−1, 1} (1.41)
Ebj = Jipi (1.42)
Y b = (In − βˆRSEEG)−1(αˆι+ γˆX + δˆGX + Eb) (1.43)
⇒ βˆbRSEE (1.44)
Doing this a number of times gives a distribution of βˆ, and to construct the hypothesis
test, we take the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the distribution and see if the true β is
contained in that region.
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1.5 Simulation Results
We use the same simulation conditions as in Section 3 and estimate βˆ using both
2SLS and RSEE. Figure 1.11 plots the distribution of the estimated βˆs.
Figure 1.11: Distribution of βˆ
The RSEE estimates are very similar to 2SLS for very sparse networks and are sig-
nificantly more precise for more dense networks. Figures 1.12 and 1.13 show the size and
power, respectively. While 2SLS tests are undersized, our alternative tests are somewhat
oversized. This is less so for the bootstrap tests, which have close to nominal size for
moderately dense networks. For power, RSEE does much better, especially for more
dense networks. For example, for networks with a 10 percent density the standard 2SLS
tests are essentially uninformative against an alternative of 0, with size equal 0.021 and
power equal 0.029. The bootstrap version of our new estimator has empirical size and
power of 0.081 and 0.67, respectively.
It is often useful to consider size-adjusted power when evaluating a proposed esti-
mator. To do this, we calculate the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the empirical t-
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distribution. These correspond to the empirical critical values for that test. We then
use those critical values when computing the power. Figure 1.14 plots the size-adjusted
power. On a size-adjusted power, the bootstrap inference is much preferred to 2SLS
results.
Figure 1.12: Size
(a) Low Density (b) High Density
Figure 1.13: Power
While it is clear that the RSEE has much more power, we might be concerned that
we gain this power at the expense of more bias. Figure 1.15 shows the comparison of the
median bias.
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(a) Low Density (b) High Density
Figure 1.14: Size-Adjusted Power
RSEE is quite biased for very dense networks, however, the bias of RSEE is compa-
rable to 2SLS for reasonably sparse networks.
1.5.1 Standard Error Estimation
The estimated standard errors from the alternative method are too small when we
use the delta method. This is likely because this is for a second stage with generated
regressors, since Equation 1.27 is a function of the residuals, e, which are a product
of Equation 1.21. To test this, we plug in the true (series expansion of) error terms
into Equation 1.27 and re-run the delta method. Figure 1.16 plots the size of both
the original delta method and that without the generated regressors. This is evidence
that the delta method is not providing accurate standard errors because of a generated
regressors problem.
On the other hand, the bootstrap seems to be providing much more reasonable es-
timates of the standard error. Figure 1.17 shows the distribution of the bootstrapped
standard errors relative to the empirical standard deviation. Here we can see the boot-
strap is doing a reasonable job of approximating the standard error.
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Figure 1.15: Median Bias
1.5.2 Different n and k
We also compare our estimator across different n and k as in Section 1.3.3. Figure 1.18
shows the (size-adjusted) power of both 2SLS and RSEE. While 2SLS gets much worse
in all cases, the power of RSEE is essentially unchanged, suggesting that it performs well
in many settings. Figure 1.19 shows that the power of RSEE is not gained at the expense
of bias. It also shows that the 2SLS estimates for many covariates are potentially quite
biased.
1.6 Empirical Application
To illustrate our method, we replicate the empirical results from BDF and then
estimate peer effects for each school in the BDF sample. Following BDF, we use the In-
School sample from Wave I of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult
Health (Add Health). This is a nationally representative sample of 80 high schools and
52 middle schools. Each student in the sample was asked to fill out a questionnaire
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Figure 1.16: Comparison of Delta Methods
with questions pertaining to social and demographic characteristics, school activities
and behavior, and parent education and occupation. The questionnaire also asked each
student to list up to five male and five female friends. This friendship elicitation is
used to construct the network.5 The dependent variable is an index of participation in
recreational activities and the covariates include characteristics of the student as well as
their parents. We present a replication of the estimates from BDF, differing in that we
have a slightly different sample. Table 1.1 shows that the summary statistics in BDF
and our sample are quite similar.
We follow BDF and construct one large block diagonal friendship network where each
individual school network is placed on the diagonal. By combining all of the schools we
have constructed a very sparse network: in our sample the density is 5.67∗10−5. We then
estimate the model using 2SLS and RSEE. Table 1.2 compares the results between BDF
and our sample. Once again, there are some differences between the two samples, with the
most important being that the estimated peer effect in our sample is larger by a fraction
of a standard error. Most of the other estimated coefficients are also fairly similar. The
5While the limit of ten total friends means that some friendships might be censored, in practice very
few students list all ten.
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Figure 1.17: Distribution of Standard Errors
third column of results estimates the model using RSEE. The RSEE coefficient estimate
is within one standard error of the 2SLS estimate. The estimated standard error on the
peer effect is smaller by an order of magnitude when using RSEE.
To highlight the benefits of our method for less dense networks, we estimate the peer
effects for each school. Figure 1.20 shows a histogram of the individual school network
densities. Most of the schools are around the 1% density level, but all of them are
significantly more dense than the combined network by a factor of nearly 1,000. For each
school we estimate peer effects using both 2SLS and RSEE.6
Figure 1.21 plots the kernel density of the peer effect coefficients. The RSEE estimates
are nicely distributed around 0.3, with an interquartile range of 0.22, while the 2SLS
estimates are quite disperse, with an interquartile range of 1.21. Figure 1.22 plots the
kernel density of the peer effect standard errors. The RSEE estimates are much more
precise, with a median standard error of 0.088, while the corresponding median 2SLS
standard error is 0.89. This means that for any reasonable estimate of the peer effect
(between −1 and 1), 2SLS is unlikely to be able to reject the null hypothesis of no
6Some of the schools are completely homogeneous in one of the included covariates (Race, Born in
US, etc.) so for those schools that covariate is dropped.
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Figure 1.18: Power with different n and k
peer effects. In other words, 2SLS will be uninformative about peer effects in individual
schools.
Our method will allow for the estimation of individual school peer effects. This is
important when the unit of interest is an individual school and will allow for testing for
heterogeneity between schools. A Wald test of joint equality between the individual peer
effects and the full network peer effect (0.365) is strongly rejected (χ2 = 488), which
suggests there is substantial heterogeneity in peer effects between the schools.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we replicate the findings of Bramoulle´, Djebbari and Fortin (2009) and
highlight the weak instrument problem that results in limited power for denser networks.
We propose an alternative estimation technique that does not rely on a weak instrument
and show it performs much better than 2SLS for dense networks.
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Figure 1.19: Median Bias with different n and k
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BDF Our Sample
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Recreational Activities 2.122 1.267 1.925 1.440
Age 14.963 1.682 14.965 1.683
Female 0.535 0.499 0.535 0.499
Race is white only 0.619 0.486 0.613 0.487
Born in the US 0.928 0.259 0.923 0.266
Mother Present 0.929 0.257 0.930 0.255
Father Present 0.779 0.415 0.776 0.417
Grade 6 to 8 0.263 0.440 0.264 0.441
Grade 9 or 10 0.406 0.491 0.408 0.491
Grade 11 or 12 0.331 0.471 0.329 0.470
Parents’ labor force participation 0.965 0.184 0.907 0.290
Mother No HS 0.097 0.296 0.102 0.302
Mother is HS grad 0.284 0.451 0.320 0.467
Mother more than HS but no college 0.276 0.447 0.157 0.363
Mother College grad 0.206 0.404 0.279 0.448
Mother went to school but unknown level 0.066 0.248 0.072 0.259
Father No HS 0.081 0.273 0.084 0.277
Father is HS grad 0.211 0.408 0.231 0.421
Father more than HS but no college 0.240 0.427 0.118 0.323
Father College grad 0.178 0.383 0.270 0.444
Father went to school but unknown level 0.069 0.253 0.074 0.261
Number of Observations 55208 53601
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Figure 1.20: Histogram of School Network Density
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BDF Our Sample
2SLS 2SLS RSEE
Variable Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Own Characteristics
Age −0.022 0.011 0.086 0.004 −0.049 0.007
Female 0.213 0.015 0.219 0.015 0.185 0.012
Race is white only −0.106 0.020 −0.090 0.019 −0.085 0.014
Born in the US −0.052 0.033 0.021 0.029 0.000 0.023
Mother Present −0.013 0.036 −0.051 0.036 −0.091 0.028
Father Present −0.018 0.029 −0.020 0.029 −0.040 0.023
Grade 9 or 10 0.011 0.096 −0.125 0.043 −0.006 0.039
Grade 11 or 12 0.021 0.102 −0.328 0.048 −0.029 0.046
Mother is HS grad −0.005 0.027 0.038 0.027 0.068 0.020
Father is HS grad 0.047 0.029 0.066 0.028 0.092 0.022
Mother more than HS but no college 0.146 0.029 0.177 0.031 0.221 0.023
Father more than HS but no college 0.167 0.030 0.158 0.033 0.236 0.025
Mother College grad 0.137 0.033 0.271 0.032 0.342 0.022
Father College grad 0.127 0.031 0.256 0.031 0.327 0.023
Mother went to school but unknown level −0.010 0.038 −0.016 0.037 −0.010 0.028
Father went to school but unknown level −0.067 0.038 −0.029 0.038 −0.051 0.029
Parents’ labor force participation 0.083 0.040 0.124 0.029 0.082 0.022
Friends’ Characteristics
Age −0.061 0.020 −0.064 0.018 −0.060 0.004
Female 0.008 0.048 −0.035 0.048 −0.055 0.020
Race is white only −0.019 0.045 −0.035 0.042 0.080 0.020
Born in the US 0.042 0.066 −0.014 0.061 0.106 0.032
Mother Present 0.107 0.064 0.105 0.081 0.119 0.050
Father Present −0.109 0.053 −0.122 0.064 −0.133 0.040
Grade 9 or 10 −0.034 0.186 0.011 0.094 0.040 0.043
Grade 11 or 12 0.100 0.194 0.159 0.125 0.256 0.049
Mother is HS grad −0.047 0.050 −0.017 0.059 0.113 0.036
Father is HS grad 0.172 0.055 0.113 0.062 0.186 0.040
Mother more than HS but no college −0.038 0.068 0.073 0.074 0.197 0.041
Father more than HS but no college 0.091 0.067 0.021 0.084 0.248 0.045
Mother College grad −0.031 0.081 −0.024 0.098 0.214 0.039
Father College grad 0.124 0.061 0.118 0.083 0.314 0.041
Mother went to school but unknown level −0.094 0.070 −0.053 0.083 −0.027 0.052
Father went to school but unknown level 0.150 0.075 0.248 0.085 0.191 0.054
Parents’ labor force participation 0.151 0.073 0.085 0.065 0.013 0.040
Peer Effect Endogenous Effect 0.467 0.256 0.492 0.195 0.365 0.006
Number of Observations 55208 53601 53601
Table 1.2: Full Sample Results
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Figure 1.21: Kernel Density of Peer Effect Coefficients
Figure 1.22: Kernel Density of Peer Effect Standard Errors
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Chapter 2
Do Employers Learn from Public,
Subjective, Performance Reviews?
2.1 Introduction
The past 15 years have seen the rise of the “gig economy,” with “tens of millions of
Americans involved in some form of freelancing, contracting, temping or outsourcing”
(Scheiber, 2015). Katz and Krueger (2016) find “that the percentage of workers [in
the U.S.] engaged in alternative work arrangements–defined as temporary help agency
workers, on-call workers, contract workers, and independent contractors or freelancers–
rose from 10.1 percent in February 2005 to 15.8 percent in late 2015”. This increase
in freelancers and independent contractors has been facilitated by the development of
technological platforms that can bring together individuals (e.g. eBay, Uber, and Airbnb)
and allows for more flexible working arrangements for both workers and firms. These
platforms allow people on opposite sides of the world to transact and have the potential
to greatly increase welfare by reducing transaction costs.
One of the main requirements for the success of the new platforms is reputation:
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“successful online marketplaces have scaled because they have created well-designed rep-
utation systems that allow users to identify trusted community members to interact with”
(Stewart, 2014). Without a reputation system in place, it would be unwise to send money
to someone on eBay or get in the car of an Uber driver. This paper tests the functionality
of the reputation system of an online labor market. Similar to other online marketplaces,
the buyer (an employer) leaves feedback about the seller (the worker). This feedback
allows other buyers to learn about the quality of the seller. However, there are a number
of reasons why this feedback might not provide useful information. Reviews might be
biased because of a fear of retaliation, lack of anonymity, strategic behavior, or sorting
into reviewing (Tadelis, 2016). Further, in online labor markets, since rehiring is frequent
and an individual review can have a large impact on a worker’s reputation, employers can
gain by leaving a negative review and then rehiring the worker at a lower price. If there
is bias in the reviews, it is not obvious that feedback in online labor markets provides
useful information to other buyers, and thus, that the reputation system is functional.
I start by presenting a simple theoretical framework of employer learning that al-
lows for uninformative feedback. This model generates similar testable predictions to
the symmetric employer learning literature (Altonji and Pierret, 2001). It also generates
additional hypotheses about asymmetric learning from individual reviews. Using data
from a large online labor market, I find strong evidence that public performance reviews
do provide information to the market. First, I show that aggregate descriptive statis-
tics provide support for the symmetric employer learning hypotheses about the variance
of wages and the correlation between wages and worker characteristics. Then I focus
specifically on learning that occurs across firms and find that outside firms use reviews
to learn about worker productivity and that this learning happens quite quickly.1 These
reviews also affect how long workers stay in the labor market. Together, this body of
1I will use employer and firm synonymously throughout.
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evidence suggests that, despite an incentive to bias reviews, employers are leaving public
performance reviews that do provide information about workers’ productivity. I then
test a mechanism for this result. Using data on applications, I show that workers are
unwilling to renew employment contracts with firms that left them a negative review.
This will incentivize firms who wish to rehire a worker to leave an informative review.
Despite this mechanism, there is still an incentive for firms to behave strategically. I
investigate one possible source of this strategic behavior by looking at review comments:
firms may be able to leave a negative review score with a positive comment to convince
workers to work again. However, I find no evidence of any strategic behavior with regard
to comments. I conclude that the reputation system in this online labor market is quite
functional and that rehiring considerations help overcome the incentive for employers to
bias their reviews.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on reputation systems.2 A theme
of this literature is the documentation of various biases in reviews. A big concern is a
fear of retaliation, where one side worries that if they leave a bad (and honest) review,
the other side will retaliate in some form. This has been documented in eBay (Bolton,
Greiner and Ockenfels, 2012) and Airbnb (Fradkin et al., 2016). This can also lead to
significant review inflation, where nobody leaves bad reviews, as seen in oDesk (Horton
and Golden, 2015) and Airbnb (Zervas, Proserpio and Byers, 2015). Another, related,
concern is sorting into reviews: if the only people who leave reviews are those who
are really happy or really upset, we will get an incorrect picture of the market. This
phenomena is documented on Ebay (Dellarocas and Wood, 2007; Nosko and Tadelis,
2015; Masterov, Mayer and Tadelis, 2015) and Amazon (Hu, Zhang and Pavlou, 2009).
There are additional concerns about users purchasing reviews and/or leaving fake reviews.
Users may want to boost their profile by acquiring additional feedback through improper
2See Tadelis (2016) and Luca (2016) for recents surveys.
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channels. There is evidence of significant review buying on eBay (Brown and Morgan,
2006) and Taobao (Xu et al., 2015), as well as fake reviews on Yelp (Luca and Zervas,
2015) and Tripadvisor (Mayzlin, Dover and Chevalier, 2014). Finally, there is a potential
re-hiring bias in online labor markets. If you just hired someone who was excellent at
their job, why would you provide your competitors with this information? The argument
stems from the work of Milgrom and Oster (1987) who find that firms have an incentive
to hide their talented workers by not providing public information about their skill (for
example by promoting them). All of these biases limit the functionality and usefulness
of reputation systems.
There has also been some related work on online labor markets. Benson et al. (2015)
run a field experiment showing that the employer’s reputation affects their ability to
hire workers. On the worker side, Pallais (2013) hires workers in an online labor market
and finds that providing jobs to inexperienced workers significantly improves their later
outcomes. Similarly, Agrawal, Lacetera and Lyons (2016) show that work experience is
very important in these markets, especially for workers from developing countries. Both
of these studies are similar to mine, but focus on experience rather than reviews. While
it is true that the two are correlated, we should expect reviews to be a better signal of
worker ability. However, given the large literature on potential biases, it is unclear how
useful reviews are in these markets. Mill (2011) looks at reviews in his study of an online
labor market, however he uses reviews as a measure of weighted experience by counting
the number of different types of reviews. The goal of the current paper is to explicitly
measure the effect of receiving a single review of different types and how employers learn
from that review.
This paper also contributes to the literature on employer learning. This literature
dates back to the work of Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) who
proposed that all firms observe a noisy, publicly available signal of worker productivity.
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However, we might believe that the employing firm has more and/or better information
about a worker than outside firms. There is also evidence that outside firms learn about
the productivity of workers. There are a number of different mechanisms proposed for
this learning. Waldman (1984) proposes that outside firms learn about productivity by
observing promotions within another firm. Pinkston (2009) argues that private infor-
mation is reflected in a worker’s wage and this information is passed to other employers
when the worker makes a job transition. Finally, Kahn (2013) shows that outside firms
are able to learn more about workers whose jobs require more outside communication.
In this paper, I study a more direct mechanism for outside firms to learn about the
productivity of a worker: public performance reviews. This is the first paper to study
employer learning from this new type of information, which will become more important
as the labor market continues to become digitized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on
online labor markets and describes the data. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework
for employer learning and generates testable hypotheses. Sections 4 and 5 test these
hypotheses. Section 6 investigates the effect of reviews on worker attrition. Section 7
discusses and tests a possible mechanism for these results and Section 8 investigates other
possible strategic behavior by firms.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Online Labor Markets
Online labor markets are platforms on which workers are matched to short-term tasks
and where workers’ output is delivered to employers electronically. The combination of
these two features distinguishes this new form of labor market institution from job boards
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and social networking sites (which only perform the former function, and which focus on
formal employment) and from telework, which only does the latter. oDesk.com (which has
since rebranded as Upwork.com) had 9.7 million workers and 3.8 million employers, with
workers earning almost $1 billion in 2014 (Elance-oDesk, 2015). Other significant online
labor markets include guru.com, freelancer.com, and Amazon’s MTurk.com. Online labor
markets provide opportunities for marginally attached workers, workers from third-world
countries, and workers with flexible hours requirements. A survey of U.S. workers found
that 25% of freelancers had a traditional full-time job but were supplementing their
income with additional work. Another 26% of freelancers were classified as diversified
workers, i.e. they were working part-time at a traditional job and working as a freelancer
(upwork.com, 2015). A survey of workers on Amazon’s MTurk.com found that 34%
of workers were from India and for these workers the money earned was likely to be a
primary source of income (Ipeirotis, 2010). Online labor markets make it easy for workers
to find employers who are willing to compensate them for a variety of short-term tasks.
This study will use data from oDesk. Workers on oDesk create a profile where they
can include relevant information about themselves, including education, outside work
experience, and location. They can also take skill tests on oDesk to signal their proficiency
at different tasks. The final aspect of their profile comes from performing jobs on oDesk.
Employers on oDesk can post jobs. Workers apply to those openings and propose a wage.
The employer and worker can then bargain over the wage and when they agree, they enter
into a contract. Every time a worker is hired through oDesk, the job information and
wage are posted on their profile. When the job is complete, the employer has the option
of leaving a review, which is also posted on the worker’s profile.3 The employer grades
the worker out of five stars in six different categories: Availability, Communication,
3Workers also have an option of reviewing their employer. These reviews are simultaneous and blind,
so we would not expect there to be a threat of retaliation.
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Cooperation, Deadlines, Quality and Skills, with the average of the six scores being
shown as the overall score, which I will call the review score. Perhaps surprisingly,
reviews are left around 75% of the time. oDesk facilitates matches by allowing workers
and firms to search for each other with very detailed filters.
2.2.2 Data Description
The data consists of the universe of oDesk workers who were active in the adminis-
trative job category between January 1, 2015 and April 25, 2015. I choose to look at
administrative jobs because they are more homogenous than other categories and the
majority of them are hourly jobs.4 I observe every job these 15,684 workers have done on
oDesk from when they first joined through April 25, 2015, with the review they receive.
I also observe their profile, which includes their country, education, oDesk test scores
and previous experience. From this data, I construct a panel where each observation is
a completed job by a worker, henceforth referred to as a job. I limit my sample to the
first 20 jobs of each worker’s career to focus on the early careers of workers. Table 2.1
provides summary statistics for the workers. The majority of workers are from Lower
Middle Income countries, with India and the Philippines accounting for almost 60% of
all workers.5 Nearly half of all workers report having at least a Bachelor’s Degree. I
focus my analysis on a single category: administrative jobs. Administrative jobs consist
of data entry, web research, personal assistant jobs. These jobs are generally low-skilled
and pay a relatively low hourly wage.6 The average (partial) career is seven jobs with
each job being a fairly significant time commitment: almost a month long and 40 hours
per week. This differentiates this online labor market from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
4There are two types of jobs on oDesk: hourly and fixed price. I limit the bulk of my analysis to
hourly jobs, since I do not observe the time spent on fixed price jobs, and thus, cannot compare them.
5I classify countries according to the World Bank Country Income Classification (World Bank, 2013).
6However, the hourly wage is comparable to the average hourly wage in India and the Philippines.
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where the jobs are very short term (a few seconds to a few minutes). Here the employers
develop a significant relationship with their workers, and can learn about their produc-
tivity. Finally, workers rarely have more than one job at a time, so their career on oDesk
is fairly sequential.
Figure 2.1 shows the density of review scores across jobs. It is highly skewed towards
a perfect score. For the majority of my analysis, I will classify the review into four types:
Good, Bad, Really Bad, and No Review according to:
Review Type =

Good if Score = 5
Bad if 4 ≤ Score < 5
Really Bad if Score < 4
No Review if no review was left
(2.1)
While it may seem strange to classify a score of 4.85 out of 5 as a bad review, it is only
the 29th percentile of the distribution. Similarly, a score of 3.95 is the 10th percentile of
the review distribution, so these really are “bad” and “really bad” reviews.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Reviews
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Workers
High Income Country: OECD 0.133
High Income Country: Non-OECD 0.00964
Upper Middle Income Country 0.0539
Lower Middle Income Country 0.659
Low Income Country 0.144
Bachelor’s Degree 0.498
Master’s Degree 0.0751
Number of Outside Experiences 2.695
Number of oDesk Exams 2.131
Average Wage ($) 5.502
Average Job Duration (Hours) 170.3
Average Job Duration (Days) 29.01
Average Career Length (Jobs) 6.736
Average Number Jobs at One Time
Conditional on Having a Job
1.250
N 16189
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2.3 Theoretical Framework
To formalize the relationship between wages and reviews, I develop a simple model
of an online labor market. Workers have a publicly observable, fixed characteristic (xi)
and their productivity (θi) is a linear function of their observable characteristic and an
unobservable, permanent, idiosyncratic component (νi): θi = γxi + νi.
7 When a worker
is hired by a firm, that firm observes a noisy signal of productivity: yit = θi + it. After
the completion of the job, the firm leaves a review, rit. Consider two possible types
of review-setting. Define an informative review as any review that is a function of the
observed signal of productivity: rit = g(yit) for some weakly monotonically increasing
function g with at least one strict increase. Thus, honest revelation (rit = yit), shading by
a constant, known factor (rit = 0.7∗yit), and a threshold model
(
rit =

5 if yit ≥ y¯
1 if yit < y¯
)
are all informative reviews. Define an uninformative review as any review which con-
tains no information about the observed signal of productivity: rit ⊥⊥ yit. Examples of
uninformative reviews include choosing a review at random (rit ∼ U [1, 5]) and always
leaving the same review (rit = 3). In this competitive marketplace, wages are a func-
tion of the expected productivity of the worker, conditional on the information available:
wijt+1 = E[θi|Iit] + ηijt+1 where ηijt+1 is some job specific component that might depend
on firm j and Iit is the information about the worker that is available to the firm. Finally,
workers are assumed to stay in the market for their entire career.
Consider two possible worlds: one where all reviews are uninformative and one where
at least some reviews are informative. An uninformative world is one in which reviews
7I am assuming no human capital accumulation for simplicity, although it does not fundamentally
change the predictions.
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contain no information about the worker and therefore have no effect of wages:
wijt+1 = E[θi|xi] + ηijt+1 (2.2)
This is the extreme case where no one believes the reviews left by other firms.8
In contrast, in an informative world, at least some of the reviews contain information
about the worker, so they affect wages:
wit+1 = E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit] + ηijt+1 (2.3)
An informative world is one in which at least some employers are providing their private
information to the market.9 Although providing private information is potentially costly
to firms, there is a number of reasons we might expect this to happen. Firms might face a
“lying cost” (Gneezy, 2005) of leaving a review that differs from the observed productivity.
Firms might also be concerned about reputation effects: other workers may not want to
work for a firm who leaves many poor or uninformative reviews. Finally, a worker may
not want to be rehired by an employer that left a poor or uninformative review. All of
these factors potentially enter into the employer’s decision process.
This simple model is able to generate the three main results from the symmetric
employer learning literature (Altonji and Pierret, 2001). Without loss of generality,
assume that γ > 0, so that the observable characteristic positively affects productivity.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. In an informative world, the cross-sectional variance of wages increases
with t. In an uninformative world, the variance is constant.
When a worker is first hired, a firm does not know much about his productivity, so,
8This would also be the case if firms did not leave reviews at all.
9A more formal treatment of this model is presented in Appendix A.2.
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conditional on observables, all workers should be paid similarly. In an informative world,
firms observe the worker’s reviews and their wage will reflect their productivity. Highly
productive workers will have more wage growth than lower productivity workers, and
thus the variance of overall wages will increase over time. In an uninformative world,
reviews provide no information about the worker, so they have no effect on wages.
The other two results describe the relationship between wages and worker character-
istics.
Proposition 2. In an informative world, the marginal effect of the observable charac-
teristic on the conditional mean of wages is strictly positive and decreasing with t. In an
uninformative world, the marginal effect is strictly positive and constant.
Proposition 3. In an informative world, the marginal effect of the worker’s average
review score on the conditional mean of wages is strictly positive and increasing with t.
In an uninformative world, the marginal effect is zero.
In an informative world, the correlation between wages and easily observable charac-
teristics should decline over time, while the correlation between wages and more accurate
measures of productivity should increase. Without much information about the worker,
wages are set based on easy to observe characteristics. However, these characteristics do
not perfectly capture worker productivity. As firms learn about a worker’s productivity
through their reviews, the effect of the average review on wages will increase over time.10
In an uninformative world, there is no information in reviews, so firms are unable to
update their beliefs about workers.
This theoretical framework also allows for more direct tests of asymmetric learning.
By isolating the effect of the most recent review on wages, I can focus on workers who
10Note that this is slightly different from the symmetric employer learning models. In those models
there is some measure of productivity that is unobservable to the firm (AFQT score). In this model,
firms are able to observe the reviews, and it’s the fact that the average review gets more precise over
time that generates the predictions.
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were never previously employed by the hiring firm. This means the hiring firm does not
have any private information about the worker and therefore must rely on the public
reviews. Thus, I can test whether other firms are learning about worker productivity
through individual reviews. To do this, I first difference Equations (2.2) and (2.3). This
will difference out the effect of previous reviews.11 In an uninformative world:
∆wijt+1 = wijt+1 − wikt = E[θi|xi] + ηijt+1 − (E[θi|xi] + ηikt) (2.4)
where j indexes the firm that hired worker i in period t + 1 and k indexes the firm in
period t. In an informative world:
∆wijt+1 = wijt+1 − wikt = E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, rit] + ηijt+1 − (E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1] + ηikt)
(2.5)
These two wage equations yield the following two hypotheses about the relationship
between wage changes and worker characteristics.
Proposition 4. In an informative world, the marginal effect of the most recent review
on the conditional mean of the change in the wage is strictly positive and decreasing with
t. In an uninformative world, the marginal effect is zero.
In an informative world, if a worker receives a good review in their previous job, they
will receive an increase in their wage. This increase will decline over time, however. The
first few reviews are providing lots of new information about the worker’s productivity.
However, once the worker has a large number of reviews, the marginal effect of an ad-
11The previous reviews will not completely difference out because the weighting of each previous review
in the conditional expectation will likely change with the addition of another review. For example, in
the normal learning models, each review would have equal weights. However, comparing wages at two
time periods, there will be different numbers of reviews in the conditional expectations and thus different
weights, so the effect of any given review will not completely difference out. However, under reasonable
assumptions about the conditional expectation, the contribution of the most recent review will be much
greater than that of any of the previous reviews (since it will only be in the later conditional expectation).
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ditional review is lowered. In an uninformative world, reviews provide no information
about the worker, so they have no effect on wages.
Proposition 5. In an informative world, the marginal effect of the observable character-
istic on the conditional mean of the change in the wage is strictly negative and increasing
with t. In an uninformative world, the marginal effect is zero.
Consider two identical workers with no reviews except that one has more education
than the other. The more educated worker will receive a higher wage in the first period.
In an informative world, conditional on receiving the same review, the worker with the
lower education will see a larger increase (or a smaller decrease) in their wage than the
worker with more education. This effect will taper off over time as more of the weight is
placed on the reviews and less on education.
2.4 Aggregate Evidence
To motivate the role of employer learning in this market, I present evidence for the
first three propositions. Figure 2.2 plots the cross-sectional variance of wages for the first
20 jobs of a worker’s career.12 There are clear increases in the variance of wages over
time (p < 0.01 for the slope coefficient) which provides support for Proposition 1.
To test Propositions 2 and 3 I regress (log) wages on a number of worker character-
istics, including their country and their average review score. I estimate the following
12To eliminate the effect of attrition from oDesk on the variance, only workers who stay for at least
20 jobs are included.
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Figure 2.2: Variance of Wages
equation:
log(wit) = α + βHighIncomei + γAvgScoreit + δg(Expit)
+ θHighIncomei ∗ g(Expit) + κAvgScore ∗ g(Expit) + λXit + it
(2.6)
where HighIncomei is an indicator for whether the worker is from a high income country
and AvgScoreit is the average score of all the reviews they have received. g(Expit) is a
function of worker experience and Xit are other worker characteristics such as education
and exam scores.13 In the symmetric employer learning literature, the education of a
worker is used as an easy to observe variable that is not strongly correlated with their
productivity. However, education is self-reported on oDesk and is hard to compare across
countries, so it is not obvious that the reported education of workers provides much
information to employers. For this reason, I include the country of the worker as the
easy to observe variable. Following Altonji and Pierret (2001), I model experience as a
13For each exam on oDesk, I include an indicator for whether the worker took the exam and an
indicator for whether they scored better than the median.
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cubic polynomial and look at the relationship between worker characteristics and wages
over time.14 Figure 2.3 plots the marginal effect of the easily observable characteristic
(whether the worker is from a high income country) and the effect of the average review.15
The importance of the worker’s country in determining wages decreases over time, while
the effect of the average review score increases, which provides support for Propositions
2 and 3.
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Figure 2.3: Marginal Effects of Worker Characteristics on Wages
These results suggest that the public performance reviews are informative and the
labor market learns about the ability of workers over time. While these results are
consistent with a model of symmetric learning, the theoretical framework allows for
predictions about asymmetric learning from reviews. To test these predictions, I need
to directly measure the effect of a single review on how much workers are paid by other
employers.
14Again, I limit my sample to workers who stay for at least 20 jobs.
15Appendix A.1 provides the regression estimates.
46
Do Employers Learn from Public, Subjective, Performance Reviews? Chapter 2
2.5 Learning by Other Firms
To focus on across-firm learning, I now limit my sample to the 80% of jobs in which
the worker was never previously employed by the hiring firm. I then regress the change in
the (log) wage on worker characteristics, job characteristics and the previous performance
review of the worker. A correlation between previous performance reviews and wage
changes suggests that these reviews are providing information about the worker to future
employers. To test for changes over time, I include an indicator that equals one for all
jobs after the fifth and its interactions with review type. This allows me to distinguish the
initial effects of performance reviews from their later effects.16 I estimate the following
equation:
∆ log(wijt) = βReviewTypeit + γAfterit + δ(ReviewTypeit ∗ Afterit)
+ ρCountryIncomei + τ (CountryIncomei ∗ Afterit)
+ λXit + µJit + νi + κj + ijt E[ijt|Zijt] = 0
(2.7)
where ReviewTypeit are indicators for the type of the most recent review and
CountryIncomei are indicators for the income classification of the worker’s country.
Xit are worker characteristics, such as education, exam scores, and previous review scores
and Jit are job characteristics, which include indicators for different words that show up
in the job titles.17 νi are worker fixed effects and κj are firm fixed effects, which are
16The results are consistent for a number of different cut-points and non-parametric experience. See
Appendix A.8.
17To generate the job title indicators, I construct a separate dataset of administrative jobs. I construct
a document term matrix with the titles of every job. I then run a cross-validated LASSO of the job wage
on its document terms (Friedman, Hastie and Tibshirani, 2010). This regularization picks the job title
terms that best explain the wage. This procedure will capture differences in wages that are explained
by the job title. Given the list of important terms, I create indicators for whether any of the jobs in the
main dataset contained those terms.
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included depending on the specification. Finally, Zijt contains all the included variables.
Table 2.2 shows the results. The results are broadly consistent across specifications.
For specification 4, initially there is a significant effect of both really bad and good
reviews on the conditional mean of wage changes. On average, receiving a really bad
review lowers a worker’s next wage by 10% relative to receiving a bad review. Similarly,
receiving a good review increases the worker’s next wage by 4%. There is no significant
difference between receiving no review and receiving a bad review. After five reviews,
there is no significant penalty for a really bad review nor a bonus for a good review. This
provides support for informative reviews from Proposition 4: firms learn very quickly
about the productivity of workers, initially wages react to new information about worker
productivity, however, after a few periods, new information has a reduced impact.
Specification 3 provides limited evidence for Proposition 5. Initially, being from a
high income country relative to a low income country decreases your next wage by 11%,
but this effect decreases to 9% after five jobs. After only five jobs firms are still willing
to pay a premium for workers from higher income countries. While the decrease is not
significant at the usual levels, there does seem to be a decline in the amount of the
premium.
Finally, comparing specifications 2 and 4 suggests there is sorting along a non-wage
dimension as well as by wages. Specification 4 is comparing identical workers working for
identical firms. Specification 2 does not control for firm characteristics, so workers who
receive a good review are willing to take a small pay cut (go from a 4% wage increase to
only a 2% wage increase) to work for (presumably) a better firm. Similarly, workers who
receive a really bad review can reduce their wage penalty by working for a different type
of firm (go from a 11% wage decrease to only a 3.5% decrease).
We can further investigate these learning results by splitting the workers and firms
into different categories. First, we might think that there are differences in how firms
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Table 2.2: Effect of Reviews on Wage Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Really Bad Review
First 5 Jobs -0.0291 -0.0350 -0.0593∗ -0.108∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0229) (0.0281) (0.0387)
After 5 Jobs -0.00142 0.00662 -0.0152 -0.0320
(0.00815) (0.00985) (0.0155) (0.0197)
No Review
First 5 Jobs 0.0235 0.0265 0.0381 0.0112
(0.0146) (0.0196) (0.0237) (0.0314)
After 5 Jobs 0.0119+ 0.0117 0.0178 0.0223
(0.00614) (0.00758) (0.0123) (0.0157)
Good Review
First 5 Jobs 0.0202∗ 0.0192 0.0507∗∗ 0.0404+
(0.00958) (0.0127) (0.0155) (0.0222)
After 5 Jobs 0.0134∗∗ 0.00950 0.00712 0.00205
(0.00514) (0.00630) (0.0103) (0.0130)
High Income Country
First 5 Jobs -0.0434∗∗ -0.109∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0238)
After 5 Jobs -0.0249∗∗ -0.0897∗∗
(0.00645) (0.0182)
Worker Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.0452 0.130 0.430 0.605
Number of Workers 12924 9939 11036 7434
Number of Firms 43466 42217 12839 11594
Number of Observations 72187 69202 41560 36798
Note: The omitted review type is Bad Review and the omitted country type is Low Income. Regres-
sions contain controls for education, country, previous reviews, previous experiences, exam scores
and participation, and job titles. The sample is the first 20 jobs of each worker’s career.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at the worker level reported in
parentheses
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learn about worker’s from different countries. In particular, since most firms are from
high income countries, we might expect them to learn about workers from high income
countries differently from workers from low income countries. Table 2.3 splits workers into
two categories according to the World Bank classification of their country. Here we can see
that the learning results are primarily driven by the workers from low income countries.
Reviews do not have a significant effect on workers from high income countries, but they
are quite important for workers in developing countries. These results are consistent with
Agrawal, Lacetera and Lyons (2016) but provide evidence that the effect is going through
reviews and not just work experience.
Table 2.3: Effect of Reviews on Wage Changes by Worker Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Really Bad Review
First 5 Jobs -0.0340+ -0.0395+ -0.0708∗ -0.110∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0239) (0.0292) (0.0401)Low Income
After 5 Jobs -0.000891 0.00581 -0.0138 -0.0312
(0.00866) (0.0104) (0.0163) (0.0202)
High Income
First 5 Jobs 0.0123 0.0192 0.0509 -0.0512
(0.0477) (0.0631) (0.0674) (0.106)
After 5 Jobs -0.00313 0.0151 -0.0257 -0.0455
(0.0205) (0.0272) (0.0457) (0.0711)
Good Review
First 5 Jobs 0.0228∗ 0.0229+ 0.0541∗∗ 0.0500∗
(0.0104) (0.0136) (0.0165) (0.0231)Low Income
After 5 Jobs 0.0140∗ 0.0101 0.00800 0.00320
(0.00544) (0.00661) (0.0108) (0.0135)
High Income
First 5 Jobs 0.00647 -0.00486 0.0231 -0.0736
(0.0195) (0.0279) (0.0403) (0.0699)
After 5 Jobs 0.0106 0.00437 -0.00160 -0.0118
(0.0150) (0.0200) (0.0319) (0.0477)
Worker Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.0450 0.130 0.430 0.605
Number of Workers 12924 9939 11036 7434
Number of Firms 43466 42217 12839 11594
Number of Observations 72187 69202 41560 36798
Note: The omitted review type is Bad Review. Workers are classified by the World Bank category of their coun-
try. Regressions contain controls for education, country, previous reviews, previous experiences, exam scores and
participation, and job titles. The sample is the first 20 jobs of each worker’s career.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at the worker level reported in parentheses
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We can also split the sample by looking at the work experience of firms. We might
expect that there is learning going on by firms about how to use reviews to evaluate
workers. Table 2.4 splits firms into two experience categories by the number of jobs they
have completed. More experienced firms are much more likely to use reviews to learn
about worker productivity. Almost all of the learning results from Table 2.2 are coming
from experienced firms. This suggests there is a learning curve in this online platforms.
Table 2.4: Effect of Reviews on Wage Changes by Firm Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Really Bad Review
First 5 Jobs 0.0312 0.00688 -0.0326 -0.0344
(0.0270) (0.0356) (0.0503) (0.0751)Low Exp Firm
After 5 Jobs 0.000950 0.0122 -0.00700 -0.00928
(0.0135) (0.0156) (0.0355) (0.0451)
High Exp Firm
First 5 Jobs -0.0532∗ -0.0520+ -0.0723∗ -0.118∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0268) (0.0299) (0.0398)
After 5 Jobs -0.00154 0.00873 -0.0122 -0.0288
(0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0165) (0.0205)
Good Review
First 5 Jobs 0.00352 -0.00707 0.00356 -0.0135
(0.0154) (0.0201) (0.0310) (0.0481)Low Exp Firm
After 5 Jobs 0.0192∗ 0.0194+ 0.0219 0.0312
(0.00896) (0.0104) (0.0227) (0.0280)
High Exp Firm
First 5 Jobs 0.0299∗ 0.0353∗ 0.0528∗∗ 0.0442+
(0.0121) (0.0155) (0.0172) (0.0235)
After 5 Jobs 0.0111 0.0116 0.0123 0.00493
(0.00711) (0.00825) (0.0114) (0.0141)
Worker Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.0475 0.0948 0.397 0.577
Number of Workers 12924 10063 11180 7582
Number of Firms 43466 42948 13153 11922
Number of Observations 72187 70834 42682 37936
Note: The omitted review type is Bad Review. Firms are split by the median number of jobs. Regressions contain
controls for education, country, previous reviews, previous experiences, exam scores and participation, and job
titles. The sample is the first 20 jobs of each worker’s career.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at the worker level reported in parentheses
51
Do Employers Learn from Public, Subjective, Performance Reviews? Chapter 2
2.6 Worker Attrition
In the previous section, we saw that reviews have an effect on wages early in a
worker’s career, but this effect is reduced after only a few jobs. It is possible that these
public performance reviews also have an effect on worker attrition: whether they continue
working in this online labor market. To motivate this idea, I look at the variance of wages
over the first 20 jobs for two populations, workers who stayed for 20 jobs and all workers.
Figure 2.4 reproduces Figure 2.2. Figure 2.5 shows the variance for all workers, which
does not exhibit the same increase over time. This suggests that, while firms are learning
about the workers who stay, the workers who stay are different from those who leave.
One hypothesis is that lower productivity workers choose to leave the labor market rather
than accept low wages.18 If this is true, than the results in the previous section have
been biased towards zero, as workers who receive poor reviews choose to leave rather
than accept negative wage changes, and thus, the true effects of reviews on wage changes
are even greater.
Figure 2.6 shows a hypothetical example that is consistent with the observed trends
in variance. Workers 1 and 2 stay for all three periods. The conditional variance only
includes them, and increases over time as their wages diverge. Worker 3 stays for two
periods with a constant wage and then leaves, while worker 4 only stays for one period.
The unconditional variance includes all four workers and is constant over time. This is
because the workers who leave have lower productivity than the workers who stay.
To test the hypothesis that public performance reviews affect worker attrition in an
online labor market, I model workers’ careers using a discrete-time proportional hazard
model. My outcome of interest is whether that worker is hired again on oDesk. This
outcome is a function of a fully non-parametric baseline hazard rate as well as worker
18It is also possible that higher productivity workers choose to leave instead.
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characteristics. In particular, I allow the overall hazard rate to depend on all the variables
from Equation 2.7, as well as allowing the effects of previous reviews and the worker’s
average review score to vary over time. Thus, the hazard rate for worker i and job t is
given by:
λit = λ0(t) ∗ exp (βtReviewTypeit + γtAvgScoreit + δXit + µJit) (2.8)
where both βt and γt vary with t. Figure 2.7 shows the baseline hazard.
19 The probability
of leaving the online labor market gradually declines over time.20 This means that workers
are less likely to leave the longer they stay in the market.
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Figure 2.7: Baseline Hazard
To investigate the effect of reviews on attrition, Figure 2.8 plots the hazard rate for
receiving each type of review for each job number. All three of the actual review types
follow a similar pattern, with a sharp decline in the probability of leaving in the first
19I estimate a discrete-time proportional hazard model allowing for normally-distributed unobserved
heterogeneity and cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no unobserved heterogeneity, so my
preferred specification assumes no unobserved heterogeneity.
20p < 0.01 for the slope of the estimated coefficients.
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few reviews. Receiving no review has a much different effect. For the first job, receiving
no review is similar to receiving a good review, however, in all subsequent jobs, workers
are much more likely to leave the labor market if they do not receive a review. This is
consistent with workers having an expectation of receiving some type of feedback. Since
we have already seen the importance of reviews with respect to wages, failing to receive a
review may cause workers to become disheartened with the online labor market and leave.
Workers who receive a really bad review are over twice as likely to leave as those who
receive a good review. After a few jobs, the hazard rates start to converge, suggesting
that the type of review does not affect the probability of leaving.
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Figure 2.8: Hazard Rate by Review Type
Figure 2.9 plots the marginal effect of the review types relative to a bad review.
This plot clearly shows that really bad reviews almost always increase the probability of
leaving, while good reviews always decrease the probability. However, these differences
decrease over time.
To test this convergence, Figure 2.10 plots the difference between the marginal effects
of a good review and a really bad review. While the difference does not go to zero in the
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Figure 2.9: Marginal Effects of Review Type
first 20 jobs, there is a clear decline in the differences between types of review.21
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Figure 2.10: Difference in Marginal Effects of Review Type
Finally, Figure 2.11 plots the marginal effect of the worker’s average review score on
their hazard rate. A one point increase in the worker’s average score–going from a 4
21p < 0.01 for the slope of the estimated coefficients.
56
Do Employers Learn from Public, Subjective, Performance Reviews? Chapter 2
to a 5–decreases their probability of leaving by between 2% and 3%. While this is a
significant and intuitive result, note that the marginal effect does not change much over
time. This result is consistent with firms (and workers) being Bayesian updaters: an
individual signal declines in importance over time, however the average of all the signals
remains significant.
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Figure 2.11: Marginal Effect of Score
The above results provide additional evidence that performance reviews are providing
information to the market.22 If neither firms nor workers believed the reviews, then there
should be no effect of a particular review type on the probability of a worker leaving the
market. This also means that the wage results from the previous section are attenuated,
since some workers who receive poor reviews exit the market rather than receive low
wages. Together, these results suggests that both firms and workers are learning from
these reviews and thus, that firms are providing their private information to the labor
market. However, it is not obvious why this is the case. I now investigate a possible
mechanism that would induce firms to leave informative reviews.
22Appendix A.9 provides additional evidence that reviews affect the time to find a new job.
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2.7 Why Do Employers Leave Informative Reviews?
As pointed out in the Introduction, there are a number of different reasons we might
expect biased reviews in these new markets. In online labor markets in particular, there is
a high percentage of repeat transactions. In many online marketplaces, such as Amazon,
it is straightforward to make a repeat purchase. Labor markets, on the other hand, are
two-sided, so both the firm and the worker need to want to match again for there to be
a repeat purchase. If workers feel they have been unfairly reviewed, they are unlikely to
want to work for that firm again. As one worker put it on the official oDesk forum:
This happens to me sometimes... They hire me, and then give me 4 stars and
a review that makes me sound like I should have gotten 6 stars. Then they
offer me more work... No thanks, I don’t want more 4 star reviews tarnishing
my reputation (Daniel C, 2015).
If a worker does not want to work again for a firm, there will be no repeat purchases. As
an employer commented:
I think a lot of clients [don’t] want to rock the boat, encounter confrontation
or jeopardize the relationship moving forward... that’s why there are so many
five star ratings (Scott E, 2016).
If firms are interested in rehiring the worker, they may be required to leave informative
feedback. This suggests a mechanism by which firms are forced to leave informative
feedback.23 To test this mechanism, I turn to application data that provides information
on worker decision-making. I want to investigate the effect of reviews on subsequent
decisions by firms and workers who have previously matched. After a completed job, I
23Firms might also be tempted to leave overly positive feedback in the hopes of rehiring a worker.
Horton and Golden (2015) investigate the possibility of review inflation on oDesk and find strong evidence
that some firms do inflate their reviews.
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observe both worker and firm behavior with regard to subsequent job postings by the same
firm. I model the decisions of both workers and firms as a function of the characteristics
of their first encounter.
2.7.1 Data
I construct a sample of 11,175 completed administrative jobs. For each job, I observe
the worker, firm, and the public performance review. I then look for subsequent job
postings (in the next four months) by the firm and applications by the worker to those
jobs.24 For each application, I see who initiated the application (worker or firm) as well
as the outcome of that application. Most applications are worker-initiated, however, the
firm has the option of seeking out workers and asking them to apply to their posted
job.25 Once there are applications to a job posting, the firm can choose to hire any,
or all, of the applicants. There are thus five possible outcomes after a completed job
by a worker-firm pair with a subsequent job posting: no application, worker-initiated
application and not hired, worker-initiated application and hired, firm-initiated and not
hired, and firm-initiated and hired.26
2.7.2 Model
I model the subsequent decisions of both worker and firm as a function of the pre-
vious review. I model this as a bivariate probit, where workers and firms each receive
(potentially correlated) shocks and then make their own decision about whether to match.
Figure 2.12 shows the decision tree.
24I limit my sample to only workers who work at least one more job (from any employer) in the future,
to control for attrition.
25While this allows for private offers as in Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004), all job postings are public so
it is not obvious what behavior we should expect.
26If the firm initiates the application and the worker is not hired, this could either mean the worker
chose not to apply or that they did apply but were not ultimately chosen by the firm.
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Figure 2.12: Decision Tree for Contract Renewals
If both worker and firm decide to match, I observe an application and a hiring. If
only one wants to match, I see that type of application, but no hire, and if neither wants
to match, I do not observe an application. Both worker and firm decisions depend on
the previous public performance review as well as other worker and firm characteristics.
The worker’s decision is:
WantToMatch = 1{x′β + w > 0} (2.9)
while the firm’s decision is:
WantToMatch = 1{z′γ + f > 0} (2.10)
where w
f
 ∼N(
0
0
 ,
1 ρ
ρ 1
)
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and x are variables that affect the worker’s decision and z are variables that affect the
firm’s decision. I include the same variables as in Equation 2.7 for both the workers’ and
firms’ decisions. The likelihood function for the full model is given in Equation 2.11.
f(outcome|β, γ) =

Φ(x′β)Φ(z′γ) if Hired
Φ(x′β)(1− Φ(z′γ)) if Worker App, Reject
(1− Φ(x′β))Φ(z′γ) if Client App, Reject
(1− Φ(x′β))(1− Φ(z′γ)) if No App
(2.11)
where Φ is the standard normal CDF.
2.7.3 Results
Figure 2.13 shows predicted contract renewal rates based on maximum likelihood
estimates of Equation 2.11.27 The effect of no review is similar to a really bad review
for both workers and firms and there is a monotonic trend in the effect of review types
on subsequent decisions. Both firms and workers are twice as likely to want to match
again if the previous review was good than if it was really bad. This suggests that firms
are “honest” in their reviews, in the sense that they are more likely to rehire someone to
whom they gave a good review. Consistent with the qualitative evidence, workers also
select based on the reviews they receive. They are much less likely to apply to a job
from someone who has given them a negative review. Finally, the estimated correlation
coefficient (ρˆ = 0.95) suggests that almost all of the decision-making shock is match
specific.
Note that these results are not necessarily identifying the true desires of workers and
27Table A.3 in Appendix A.9.1 provides the coefficients.
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firms. It is certainly possible that firms would like to shade their reviews (as the theory
suggests), but they know that workers will not work be willing to work again if they
receive a poor review. However, these results are providing an estimate of the causal
link between reviews and subsequent hires. Thus, these estimates provide evidence for a
mechanism that induces firms to leave informative reviews. Since the incentive to bias
reviews only exists when there is a possibility of a repeat purchase, if workers remove
that possibility, then there are unlikely to be biased reviews.
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Figure 2.13: Effect of Reviews on Subsequent Decisions
2.8 Review Comments
All of the previous evidence suggests that firms are providing their private informa-
tion to the labor market. However, the incentive remains for firms to gain by acting
strategically. Another aspect of the review process is that firms can leave a comment
along with their score. It is possible that firms use these comments to try and convince
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workers to work again while also leaving them less than perfect scores to bias down their
market wage. For this to work, the market must place more relative weight on the review
score (vs. the comment) than the worker does. One worker on the forum wondered about
the prevalence of this practice:
Is it common for clients that close a contract, and rehire the freelancer on a
new contract, to give less than perfect scores? Like, great written feedback,
but less than perfect stars (Mariska P, 2015)?
If some firms are behaving in this way, this strategic behavior might be missed by my
previous analysis. To look at the effect of review comments, I classify each comment
according to its positivity using the VADER model of sentiment analysis (Hutto and
Gilbert, 2014). This algorithm assigns a score between -1 and 1 based on analysis of the
words in the review comment. Individual words are scored based on their positivity and
intensity and the length of the comment is also taken into account. Figure 2.14 shows
the overall density of the scores and Figure 2.15 shows the densities broken up by review
type. There is clearly a correlation between the review score and the comment score, but
there is some variation for all three review types. I then further classify the comments
into Good, Bad, Really Bad, and No Comment by partitioning the (overall distribution
of) comment scores in thirds.
2.8.1 Effects on Wages
To investigate this possible method of strategic behavior, I start by testing the relative
importance of the review score and comment in the wage. If the review comment is
reflected in the wage, then there is no incentive for firms to leave a glowing review
comment, since it will affect the future wage. I re-run Equation 2.7 and interact the
review types with the comment types. Recall from Table 2.2 that relative to a good
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review, a bad review significantly decreased the next wage. The results in Table 2.5 are
relative to a good review with any type of comment.28 Notice that receiving a bad review
with a good comment also results in a significant wage decrease. Furthermore, for each
review type I am unable to reject the joint hypothesis of the effects of the comments all
being equal. This suggests that the review comments are largely ignored by other firms,
since they do not affect wages. This means there is an incentive for a firm to leave a
good comment if it will persuade the worker to work again in the future.
28I group all of the good review comments for two reasons. First, it maintains consistency between the
two tables, and second, it increases power. If I compare relative to a good review with a good comment,
the coefficients are similar but much less precise.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Review Comments on Wage Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Really Bad Review
Really Bad Comment -0.137+ -0.0852∗∗ -0.0813∗ -0.111∗
(0.0787) (0.0295) (0.0402) (0.0492)
Bad Comment -0.00938 -0.0132 -0.0296 -0.0198
(0.0902) (0.0444) (0.0591) (0.0581)
Good Comment -0.202+ -0.0730 -0.0965 -0.0974
(0.116) (0.0612) (0.0670) (0.0765)
No Comment -0.142∗∗ -0.0356+ -0.0358 -0.107∗∗
(0.0415) (0.0211) (0.0272) (0.0322)
Bad Review
Really Bad Comment -0.0182 -0.0347∗ -0.0316 -0.0731∗∗
(0.0399) (0.0176) (0.0233) (0.0277)
Bad Comment -0.0395 -0.00555 -0.00331 -0.0110
(0.0442) (0.0179) (0.0230) (0.0326)
Good Comment -0.0779 -0.0507∗∗ -0.0668∗ -0.0677∗
(0.0494) (0.0193) (0.0267) (0.0321)
No Comment -0.0385 -0.00481 -0.00251 -0.0351
(0.0309) (0.0133) (0.0178) (0.0214)
Worker Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Firm Fixed Effects
R2 0.606 0.0449 0.129 0.431
Number of Workers
Number of Firms
Number of Observations 36812 72204 69214 41577
Note: The omitted review type is Good Review. This is showing the results for the first five jobs of a worker’s
career. Regressions contain controls for education, country, previous reviews, previous experiences, exam
scores and participation, and job titles. The sample is the first 20 jobs of each worker’s career.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at the worker level reported in parentheses
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2.8.2 Effect on Contract Renewals
I now want to test whether the review comments have an effect on the worker’s
decision-making. To do this I re-run the contract renewal model including the interaction
between review type and comment type. Figure 2.16 shows the results for workers. There
is no significant difference in workers’ response to different comment types. This suggests
that workers can not be swayed by a positive review comment and that firms do not
behave strategically in this manner.
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Figure 2.16: Effect of Comments on Subsequent Decisions for Workers
2.9 Conclusion
Worker’s scores on oDesk are voluntary, public, subjective, performance reviews. To
date, these types of reviews have received very little theoretical or empirical attention in
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labor markets, in part because they were not common before the advent of online labor
markets. With the rapid expansion of platforms like oDesk, however, understanding
whether and how these reviews work is of increasing importance. Despite incentives for
firms to bias such reviews, I find that other firms are learning from these public reviews,
suggesting that the reviews are positively correlated with worker-specific productivity.
I investigate a number of behaviors to test this, including wage setting, exit from the
market, and contract renewals, and conclude that outside firms use performance reviews
to learn about the productivity of workers and that the learning happens quickly. I
find that performance reviews impact whether workers stay in this online labor market:
worker attrition depends on the early reviews they receive. This suggests that public
performance reviews are operating on two distinct levels. They provide information to
other employers about the quality of the worker, while also providing information to the
worker about their ability to succeed in this labor market. I test a possible mechanism
for inducing firms to provide their private information. I find evidence that workers will
not work again for a firm that leaves them a poor review or no review. This mechanism
results in a functioning reputation system in this online labor market. These results
have implications for the larger gig economy as more and more online markets rely on
reputation systems to function.
2.10 Permissions and Attributions
Chapter 2 benefited greatly from feedback from Peter Kuhn.29
29I also thank Doug Steigerwald, Dick Startz, and seminar participants at the ZEW Workshop on
Atypical Employment, the Trans-Pacific Labor Seminar, the WEAI Annual Conference, the WUSTL
Graduate Economics Conference, Berkeley, UCSB and Wisconsin Whitewater for helpful comments and
suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the NET Institute (www.NETinst.org).
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Chapter 3
How Competitive are Online Labor
Markets? Evidence from oDesk
3.1 Introduction
In influential work, Card et al. (2016) (CCHK) have argued that labor market frictions
(modeled as monopsony power) play important roles in explaining the wage distribution
in national labor markets. Other modeling approaches based on search and matching,
(e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)), come to similar conclusions about the role of
labor market frictions in generating wage distributions. Recently, a number of innovations
in labor markets, starting with job boards and now more recently with online labor
markets, have tried to reduce these frictions by making it easier for workers and firms to
match, and making more information available to both parties. Have these new types of
labor markets succeeded in reducing market frictions? I study this question by comparing
an online labor market, oDesk, to oﬄine labor markets. First, I use data from oDesk
to estimate a two-way fixed effects model in the style of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis
(1999) (AKM). These models allow for a decomposition of worker and employer-specific
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wage premiums. I compare my estimates to the existing literature on AKM estimates for
the United States and find that online labor markets have a higher variance of employer-
specific wage premiums. I then use the imperfect competition model from CCHK to
show that the underlying parameters governing market frictions can be mapped to these
employer-specific wage premiums. This suggests that online labor markets are more
competitive than traditional labor markets.
There is a significant body of literature in labor economics that tries to explain the
variance of worker wages. Much of the search literature has recognized the importance of
frictions in search and matching between workers and firms in generating a distribution
of wages, even for equivalent workers (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Rogerson, Shimer
and Wright, 2005; Pissarides, 2011). A second strand of literature tries to decompose the
variance of wages into worker and firm components. In the pioneering work of AKM, they
use matched employer-employee data from France to separately identify the contributions
of workers and firms to wage variation. This style of two-way fixed effects model has been
used to study the labor markets of a number of different countries. All of these studies use
linked employer-employee administrative data which includes information on wages and
some worker characteristics. Table 3.1 provides a summary of recent results.1 Between
15-30% of the variation in wages is explained by variation in the firm effects. There is
substantial heterogeneity across the countries, with the United States having by far the
largest variance of firm effects. As we will see from the model, this suggests the US labor
market is the most competitive of the countries listed. For a given distribution of firm
productivity, a higher variance of firm effects implies that workers face fewer frictions in
moving between employers in response to those productivity differentials and that wages
are closer to firms’ marginal product.
1All of these studies look across a number of different industries, however Abowd et al. (2014) estimate
an AKM model within industries and the results are similar.
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CCHK provide a micro-founded model of imperfect competition that generates wages
that are consistent with the assumptions of AKM. I use the CCHK model to map the
variance of firm productivity, the degree of labor market frictions, and the workers’
outside options to the theoretical firm fixed effects. I then use estimates of the firm fixed
effects using data from oDesk, as well as existing US estimates from Abowd, Lengermann
and McKinney (2002) to compare three different labor markets: the oDesk market for
US workers, the oDesk market for developing country workers, and the oﬄine US market.
These comparisons, combined with the assumptions in the model, let me infer differences
in competitiveness across markets. I find evidence that the online labor market is more
competitive than the oﬄine US market. I also find evidence that the outside options of
workers on oDesk are lower than in traditional labor markets, which potentially explains
the growth of these online labor markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical frame-
work. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section
5 lays out the imperfect competition model of CCHK and Section 6 maps the empirical
results to implications for competitiveness.
3.2 Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis will follow AKM by specifying a model of log wages with
additive worker and firm effects. Specifically, in a given market, I will model the log
wage of person i, working for firm j, at job number t as:
lnwijt = αi + ψj +X
′
itθ + ijt (3.1)
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where Xit is a vector of time varying controls (e.g. worker experience and year dummies),
αi is the worker fixed effect, ψj is the firm fixed effect and ijt is an unobserved error
term. Estimates from this model can then be used to decompose wages according to the
following formula:
V ar(lnwijt) = V ar(αi) + V ar(ψj) + V ar(X
′
itθ) + V ar(ijt)
+2Cov(αi, ψj) + 2Cov(αi, X
′
itθ) + 2Cov(ψj, X
′
itθ)
(3.2)
Estimating this model for each labor market allows us to compare the relative variation
in firm fixed effects.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Online Labor Markets
Online labor markets are a growing proportion of the world economy.2 oDesk.com
(which has since rebranded as Upwork.com) had 9.7 million workers and 3.8 million em-
ployers, with workers earning almost $1 billion in 2014 (Elance-oDesk, 2015). Other sig-
nificant online labor markets include guru.com, freelancer.com, and Amazon’s MTurk.com.
Online labor markets provide opportunities for marginally attached workers, workers from
third-world countries, and workers with flexible hours requirements. Online labor mar-
kets make it easy for workers to find employers who are willing to compensate them for
a variety of short-term tasks.
This study will use data from oDesk. Workers on oDesk create a profile where they
can include relevant information about themselves, including education, outside work
experience, and location. They can also take skill tests on oDesk to signal their proficiency
2Most of this description comes from Wood-Doughty (2017)
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at different tasks. The final aspect of their profile comes from performing jobs on oDesk.
Employers on oDesk can post jobs. Workers apply to those openings and propose a
wage. The employer and worker can then bargain over the wage and then enter into a
contract. Every time a worker is hired through oDesk, the job information and wage
are posted on their profile. When the job is complete, the employer has the option of
leaving a review, which is also posted on the worker’s profile.3 oDesk facilitates matches
by allowing workers and firms to search for each other with very detailed filters.
3.3.2 Data Description
The data consists of a sample of oDesk workers who were active in the administrative
job category between January 1, 2015 and April 25, 2015. I observe every job these
11,676 workers have done on oDesk from when they first joined, (some as early as 2007),
through April 25, 2015, with the review they receive. I choose to look at administrative
jobs because they are more homogenous than other categories and the majority of them
are hourly jobs.4 I also observe each worker’s profile, which includes their country,
education, oDesk test scores and previous experience. From this data, I construct a
panel where each observation is a completed job by a worker, henceforth referred to as
a job. Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the workers. I split my sample into
workers from developing countries and those from the United States. Half of all workers
from developing countries report having at least a Bachelor’s Degree. I focus my analysis
on a single category: administrative jobs. Administrative jobs consist of data entry, web
research, and personal assistant jobs. These jobs are generally low-skilled and pay a
relatively low hourly wage.5 There are significant wage differences between the workers
3Workers also have an option of reviewing their employer. These reviews are simultaneous and blind,
so we would not expect there to be a threat of retaliation.
4There are two types of jobs on oDesk: hourly and fixed price. I limit my analysis to hourly jobs,
since I do not observe the time spent on fixed price jobs, and thus, cannot compare them.
5However, the hourly wage is comparable to the average hourly wage in India and the Philippines.
72
How Competitive are Online Labor Markets? Evidence from oDesk Chapter 3
from developing countries and those from the United States. The average (partial) career
is ten jobs with each job being a fairly significant time commitment: almost a month
long and 40 hours per week. The average review score is around a 4.7 out of 5. While
this type of market is different from the standard labor market in developed countries, it
is not all that different from temporary staffing agencies, which account for around 2% of
the U.S. labor market (American Staffing Association, 2017; Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2017).
For each job a worker completes, I also observe information about the hiring firm.
Table 3.3 provides summary statistics for these firms again split by which market they
are in. The first column provides a summary of all the firms in the sample. For around
half of them, I have additional data on firm characteristics, which are displayed in the
second column. Almost all of the firms are located in OECD countries, with the majority
in the United States. The average review a firm receives after a completed job is around
a 4.7 out of 5. The average number of jobs a firm has hired is quite high, although this
is skewed by a few very frequent hirers (the median number of jobs is 29). For a subset
of firms, I also have data on the average review they left for workers and the average
amount they pay per job.
As mentioned above, in order to identify the fixed effects, the network of workers
and firms must be connected. Furthermore, the precision of the fixed effects estimates
depends on the number of observations for each worker and firm. The more moves each
worker makes and the more workers each firm hires, the more precise the estimates. Table
3.4 provides summary statistics for worker and firm moves in the sample. Contrary to
traditional labor markets, most firms in online labor markets are quite small, in that
they only employ a few workers in this market. This is consistent with traditional firms
going to an online setting to hire specialized workers for a specific task.
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3.4 Empirical Results
To decompose the variance of wages in an online labor market, I estimate Equation
3.1 and then decompose the variance according to Equation 3.2. Table 3.5 presents the
results. The variance of wages is slightly higher for workers from developing countries
than for workers from the US. The variance of worker effects are very similar, but the
variance of firm effects for US workers is much higher. Comparing these results to the US
results in Table 3.1 suggests that the variance of firm effects for developing countries is
slightly higher than the traditional US labor market, but the variance of firm effects for
oDesk US workers is significantly higher. It is important to keep in mind that the oDesk
market is only for administrative jobs, and to the extent that cross-industry heterogeneity
is an important component of overall firm heterogeneity, the estimates of variance in the
oDesk markets will be biased downwards relative to the traditional labor markets. This
suggests there are actually larger differences in the variances than we observe.
3.4.1 Controlling for Job Heterogeneity
One explanation for the large variance of employer-specific wage premiums in online
labor markets is that different firms are hiring for different types of jobs, and the wage
premium just reflects heterogeneity in job types. Torres et al. (2013) use administrative
data from Portugal and find that job titles explain almost 10% of the wage variation.
While Portugal has a very standardized way of naming jobs, jobs titles in online labor
markets are determined by the hiring firm and are thus free-form text.6 I attempt to
control for job heterogeneity in five different ways. First, each administrative job in this
online labor market is further classified according to a subcategory. These categories
6The titles in my dataset are much noisier than in standard administrative datasets. Marinescu and
Wolthoff (2016) use job titles from CareerBuilder.com, which has more standard job titles, and find that
the titles explain almost 90% of the variation in wages. In my sample, all of the techniques combined
only explain 35% of the variation in wages.
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include “Admin Support”, “Sales & Marketing”, and “Web, Mobile & Software Devel-
opment.” I include indicator variables for each of these subcategories. Second, there is
some job-specific information available including the target skill level, target duration of
the job, and the number of applicants. For the last three classifications, I use the text
from each job title. First, I use latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to classify each title.
LDA is a Bayesian model that generates topics based on similar words (Blei, Ng and
Jordan, 2003). It then classifies each title as one of the topics. Next, I include a number
of indicators for important words in the titles. To do this, I construct a separate dataset
that includes job titles and wages. I then run a cross-validated LASSO of the job wage
on the different words in the title (Friedman, Hastie and Tibshirani, 2010). This regular-
ization picks the job title terms that best explain the wage. This procedure will capture
differences in wages that are explained by the job title. Given the list of important terms,
I create indicators for whether any of the jobs in the main dataset contained those terms.
Finally, I create a neural network in the style of Mikolov et al. (2013). This creates a
500-element vector for each title where similar titles have similar values. I then include
these vectors in the regression to control for differences between jobs. Table 3.6 presents
the results. Columns 1 and 6 are the baseline specifications for developing countries and
the US markets, respectively. Columns 2 through 5 sequentially add additional controls
for job heterogeneity for the developing country market. There does not seem to be much
change in the variance of firm fixed effects, especially when we add in the most detailed
controls. Due to the smaller sample size of the US-based oDesk market, I can only do
the first two controls. Here we do see a significant decrease in the variance of firm fixed
effects. However, these variances are still larger than both the other oDesk market and
the traditional US market, so the overall results still hold.
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3.5 Theoretical Framework
To formalize the relationship between wages, workers, and firms, I follow the imperfect
competition model of Card et al. (2016). Worker i in labor market m has indirect utility
from working for firm j:
uimj = βln(wmj − bim) + amj + imj (3.3)
where wmj is the wage paid by firm j in market m, bim is the worker’s outside option, amj
is observable firm amenities, and imj is an unobservable match preference.
7 Assuming
imj is distributed type I extreme value and there are a large number of firms, leads to
the following firm-specific labor supply functions:
lnNmj(wmj) = ln(Nλ) + βmln(wmj − bm) + amj (3.4)
where N is the number of workers and λ is constant across all firms. The parameter
of interest is βm which governs the relative importance to workers of wages compared
to firm amenities. As βm → ∞ the supply functions become perfectly elastic and we
approach a competitive labor market.
Assume firms have a linear production function and face constant price, Pmj:
Revenuemj = PmjTmj
∑
i
θmi (3.5)
where Tmj is firm productivity and θmi is an individual worker’s productivity, then solving
7Firm amenities in an online labor market may include availability, communication, and clarity of
the task.
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for the profit maximizing wages gives:
wimj =
bim
1 + βm
+
βm
1 + βm
νmjθmj (3.6)
where νmj ≡ TmjPmj is marginal labor productivity. Assume that a worker’s outside
option is a function of their productivity: bim = θimbm, then:
wimj =
θimbm
1 + βm
+
βm
1 + βm
νmjθmj =
θimbm
1 + βm
(1 +
βmνmj
bm
) (3.7)
Taking logs gives us:
lnwimj = ln(
θimbm
1 + βm
) + ln(1 +
βmνmj
bm
) = αim + ψmj (3.8)
which is additively separable in worker and firm effects within a given labor market and
can be estimated via AKM.
3.6 Implications for Competitiveness
The firm fixed effects relate our three parameters of interest: βm, bm, and ν¯mj, where
νmj ∈ [bm, ν¯m]8. We cannot separately identify the level of these parameters using only
wage data from these markets. However, we can relate these underlying parameters to
observable differences across markets. Combined with some plausible assumptions about
differences between markets, we can rank order the parameters of interest across the
three markets. The key observable difference between the markets is the variance of the
8Since firms will not operate if their marginal productivity is less than workers’ outside options, the
lower bound of productivity in the market is bm, while we are allowing the upper bound, ν¯m to vary in
different markets.
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firm fixed effects:9
V ar(ψmj) = V ar(ln(1 +
βmνmj
bm
)) (3.9)
While we do not have a nice closed form solution to V ar(ψj), we can sign the derivatives.
Taking the derivative with respect to the competitiveness of the market:
∂V ar(ψmj)
∂βm
> 0 (3.10)
The more competitive the market, the more variation in firm fixed effects. In a perfectly
competitive market, firms pay their marginal product, so the distribution of firm fixed
effects is the same as the distribution of firm productivity. As firms have more market
power, wages are compressed, so the variance of firm effects declines.
Taking the derivative with respect to the upper bound of firm productivity:
∂V ar(ψmj)
∂ν¯m
=
∂V ar(ψmj)
∂V ar(νmj)
∗ ∂V ar(νmj)
∂ν¯m
> 0 (3.11)
As the most productive firm in the market gets more productive, the overall distribution
gets more spread out, holding the bottom of the distribution fixed. Thus the variance of
firm fixed effects increases.
Taking the derivative with respect to the outside option:
∂V ar(ψmj)
∂bm
=
∂V ar(ψmj)
∂bm
+
∂V ar(ψmj)
∂V ar(νmj)
∗ ∂V ar(νmj)
∂bm
< 0 (3.12)
which is an abuse of notation. There are two effects here, both of which are negative.
First, there is a direct effect, by which increasing the outside option reduces the relative
pay gap between the market wage and the outside option. Second there is an indirect
9And an important value in much of the AKM literature.
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effect through V ar(νmj), since the outside option is the lower bound of firm productivity
in this market. Increasing this lower bound, holding the rest of the distribution constant,
will decrease the variance of firm effects.
Taking these effects together, if we compare the variance of firm effects between two
markets, we can determine the relationship between these underlying parameters. For
example, consider two markets: A and B. If we find that the variance of firm effects in
market A is greater than the variance of firm effects in market B we can conclude that:
V ar(ψA) > V ar(ψB)⇒ βA > βB and/or bA < bB and/or ν¯A > ν¯B (3.13)
If we make some reasonable assumptions about the relationships between some of the
parameters, we can potentially narrow down to learning about one of the parameters.
Given that we have some intuition about the different markets of study in this paper, we
can make some reasonable assumptions.
Comparing the US labor market with the online labor markets for the US (USO) and
developing country workers (Dev), we can assume that:
bDev < bUSO = bUS (3.14)
The outside options in developing countries are worse than in the US. Both US markets
have the same outside options (since this is net of worker ability).
ν¯Devj = ν¯
USO
j < ν¯
US
j (3.15)
The firms are the same in oDesk since they are operating in the same online market.
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There are better firms in the US oﬄine market.
βUS ≶ βDev ≶ βUSO (3.16)
We are ambivalent about the relative competitiveness between these markets. The goal
of this paper is to sign these relationships.
Then combining these assumptions with the comparisons of variances, gives us the
following predictions: Comparing US oDesk to US, if
V ar(ψUSOj ) > V ar(ψ
US
j )⇒ βUSO > βUS (3.17)
or if
V ar(ψUSOj ) < V ar(ψ
US
j )⇒ ν¯USOj < ν¯USj (3.18)
A higher variance in the online market suggests that competitiveness is driving the differ-
ence. A higher variance in the oﬄine market suggests that differences in firm productivity
are more important.
Comparing the two oDesk markets, if
V ar(ψDevj ) > V ar(ψ
USO
j )⇒ bDev < bUSO (3.19)
or if
V ar(ψDevj ) < V ar(ψ
USO
j )⇒ βDev < βUSO (3.20)
A higher variance in the developing country market suggests that a lower outside option
for those workers is driving the differences. A higher variance in the US market means
that there are competitiveness differences.
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Comparing developing countries to US, if
V ar(ψDevj ) > V ar(ψ
US
j )⇒ bDev < bUS and/or βDev > βUS (3.21)
or if
V ar(ψDevj ) < V ar(ψ
US
j )⇒ ν¯Devj < ν¯USj (3.22)
A higher variance in the developing country market means that either there are outside
option differences or competitiveness differences, or, most likely, both together. A higher
variance in the oﬄine US market means that the high end of firm productivity is driving
the differences.
Combining the empirical results in Section 3.4 with the above assumptions allows me
to infer difference in competitiveness across these markets. From Tables 3.1 and 3.5 we
observe:
V ar(ψUS) < V ar(ψDev) < V ar(ψUSO) (3.23)
Turning to the theoretical predictions, comparing US oDesk to US:
V ar(ψUSj ) < V ar(ψ
USO
j )⇒ βUS < βUSO (3.24)
which suggests the US oDesk market is more competitive than the oﬄine market. Com-
paring the two oDesk markets:
V ar(ψDevj ) < V ar(ψ
USO
j )⇒ βDev < βUSO (3.25)
which suggests there is more evidence for a difference in competitiveness than a difference
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in outside options. And finally, comparing developing countries to US, if
V ar(ψDevj ) > V ar(ψ
US
j )⇒ bDev < bUS and/or βDev > βUS (3.26)
which suggests that the oDesk market is more competitive but that the workers have
lower outside options.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that this online labor market is more compet-
itive than the traditional labor market in the US. There is also evidence that workers
in developing countries have lower outside options, and therefore are willing to work for
lower wages. This is one possible reason why firms are willing to move to these more
competitive marketplaces. Finally, it is important to note from Table 3.1 that the US
had the largest variance of firm effects, so these results will also hold in comparisons with
the other countries listed.
3.7 Conclusion
Online labor markets are an important part of the growing gig economy. These
new forms of labor markets have promised a more competitive marketplace with fewer
frictions. However, there is not yet much empirical evidence to support this claim. This
paper uses data from an online labor market to compare these markets to a traditional
labor market. I decompose the wage variance using an AKM-style model and find that
online labor markets have a higher variance of firm fixed effects. I then use a theoretical
model of imperfect competition to map the variance of firm fixed effects to the degree of
frictions in a given labor market. My results imply that online labor markets are more
competitive than traditional markets. I also find evidence that workers’ outside options
are worse in these online markets, which suggests a reason for why firms may want to
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move to these new alternative work arrangements.
3.8 Permissions and Attributions
Chapter 3 benefited greatly from feedback from Peter Kuhn.
Table 3.1: Summary of Two-Way Fixed Effects Results
Country Paper
Variance of
Log Wages
Variance of
Worker Effects
Variance of
Firm Effects
France Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) 0.270 0.207 0.081
US Abowd, Lengermann and McKinney (2002) 0.776 0.697 0.131
New Zealand Mare´ and Hyslop (2006) 0.116 0.058 0.010
Austria Gruetter and Lalive (2009) 0.224 0.148 0.083
West Germany Card, Heining and Kline (2012) 0.249 0.127 0.053
Portugal Torres et al. (2013) 0.309 0.074 0.056
Italy Macis and Schivardi (2016) 0.116 0.058 0.017
Note: The results in this table are not directly comparable, given sample selection and choice of time-varying variables
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Workers
Developing Countries US
Master’s Degree 0.0797 0.0494
(0.271) (0.217)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.518 0.385
(0.500) (0.487)
Associate’s Degree 0.0114 0.0392
(0.106) (0.194)
Other Degree 0.391 0.526
(0.488) (0.500)
Number of Outside Experiences 2.636 3.578
(2.510) (3.075)
Number of oDesk Exams 1.947 1.986
(1.250) (1.323)
Average Wage ($) 4.057 11.04
(2.981) (5.448)
Average Job Duration (Hours) 181.0 121.1
(306.2) (210.2)
Average Job Duration (Days) 26.57 30.48
(47.73) (48.83)
Number of Jobs 11.12 9.775
(10.65) (8.834)
Average Review Score 4.650 4.777
(0.457) (0.358)
N 10503 1173
Note: Means reported, standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for Firms
Developing Countries US
Full Sample Extra Covariates Full Sample Extra Covariates
High Income Country: OECD 0.926 0.926 0.948 0.946
(0.261) (0.261) (0.223) (0.226)
High Income Country: Non-OECD 0.0336 0.0336 0.0283 0.0296
(0.180) (0.180) (0.166) (0.170)
Upper Middle Income Country 0.0142 0.0132 0.0114 0.00878
(0.118) (0.114) (0.106) (0.0933)
Lower Middle Income Country 0.0221 0.0223 0.0109 0.0132
(0.147) (0.148) (0.104) (0.114)
Low Income Country 0.00325 0.00397 0.000544 0
(0.0569) (0.0629) (0.0233) (0)
Average Review Score Received 4.737 4.771 4.750 4.815
(0.632) (0.414) (0.688) (0.326)
Number of Jobs 61.88 65.92 130.9 117.1
(507.2) (123.8) (1579.2) (283.0)
Average Review Score Left 4.510 4.593
(0.587) (0.517)
Average Total Payment per Job ($) 1303.3 3280.7
(4385.8) (8001.1)
N 19706 9561 1838 911
Note: Means reported, standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3.4: Movement by Workers and Firms
Developing Countries US
Worker Moves Firm Moves Worker Moves Firm Moves
Mean 5.50 2.93 2.74 1.75
Minimum 1 1 1 1
25th Percentile 2 2 1 1
50th Percentile 4 2 2 1
75th Percentile 7 3 3 2
Maximum 61 179 35 47
Table 3.5: Decomposition of Wage Variance
Developing Countries US
Variance of Log Wages 0.54 0.48
Variance of X ′β 0.036 0.026
Variance of Worker Effects (αi) 0.25 0.24
Variance of Firm Effects (ψj) 0.15 0.26
Variance of Residuals 0.056 0.029
2*Cov(X ′β, αi) -0.0095 0.00022
2*Cov(X ′β, ψj) 0.020 0.0068
2*Cov(αi, ψj) 0.036 -0.078
Number of Workers 10503 1173
Number of Firms 19706 1838
Number of Observations 77288 5399
Note: AKM decomposition of the variance of log wages. Regression includes
indicators for years and a quadratic in worker experience.
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Table 3.6: Decomposition of Wage Variance Controlling for Job Titles
Developing Countries US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variance of Log Wages 0.536 0.536 0.536 0.554 0.554 0.480 0.480 0.480
Variance of X ′β 0.036 0.045 0.048 0.051 0.055 0.026 0.029 0.039
Variance of Worker Effects (αi) 0.252 0.232 0.226 0.222 0.218 0.240 0.316 0.317
Variance of Firm Effects (ψj) 0.147 0.127 0.126 0.149 0.148 0.256 0.162 0.174
Variance of Residuals 0.056 0.054 0.053 0.049 0.048 0.029 0.029 0.027
Job Info X X X X X X
Job Categories X X X X X X
LDA Topics X X X X
Job Title Dummies X X
Word2Vec Vectors X
Number of Workers 10503 1173
Number of Firms 19706 1838
Number of Observations 77288 5399
Note: AKM decomposition of the variance of log wages. Regression includes indicators for years and a
quadratic in worker experience.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Symmetric Employer Learning Specification
Table A.1 shows the marginal effect of worker characteristics on wages at the begin-
ning of the worker’s career and after 10 jobs. There does not appear to be any effect of
having a Bachelor’s degree on wages. This is potentially explained by education being
self-reported by workers and thus not being a reliable signal. Initially, workers from high
income countries earn 31.1% more than workers from low income countries, however,
after 10 jobs the difference is cut in half. While country remains a significant factor in
determining wages, its importance declines over time. Initially, the average review score
is a noisy signal, but after 10 jobs, a one point increase in average review score, on a
scale from 1 to 5, increases the wage by 9.3%.
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Table A.1: Marginal Effect of Education, Country, and Reviews on Wages
Log Wage
Bachelor’s Degree
Initial 0.0283
(0.0418)
After 10 Jobs -0.00271
(0.0221)
High Income Country
Initial 0.311∗∗
(0.0815)
After 10 Jobs 0.156∗∗
(0.0413)
Average Score
Initial 0.0239
(0.0351)
After 10 Jobs 0.0934∗∗
(0.0194)
R2 0.621
N 38291
Note: Experience is modeled as a cubic
polynomial. Regression contains controls
for education, previous experiences, exam
scores and participation, and job titles.
Sample is the first 20 jobs of a worker’s
career for workers who stayed at least 20
jobs.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 Robust
standard errors clustered at the worker
level reported in parentheses
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A.2 A More Formal Model
Consider a model with explicit costs of leaving a review. In particular, employers
choose to leave a review, rit ∈ [1, 5], by maximizing expected profit:1
rit = arg max
r˜it
(
E[θi|si, ri1, ..., yit]− E[θi|si, ri1, ..., r˜it]
)
f(r˜it|cH)− h(r˜it|cR)− l(yit, r˜it|cL)
(A.1)
where f(rit|cH) is the probability of rehiring the worker, e.g. f(rit|cH) = Φ(α+ cHrit) so
a better review will increase the probability of rehiring the worker. h(rit|cR) is an overall
reputation effect, e.g. h(rit|cR) = −cRrit so leaving a good review will increase expected
profits. This might be because the firm is better able to attract good workers. Finally,
l(yit, rit|cL) is a lying cost, e.g. l(yit, rit|cL) = cL(yit − rit)2 so the further the review is
from the signal, the more it costs the firm. This could either be an internal cost, a firm
doesn’t like being dishonest, or an external cost where workers might complain about
unfair reviews.
In an informative world:
wit+1 = E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit] + ηijt+1 (A.2)
rit = arg max
r˜it
(
E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, yit]− E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, r˜it]
)
Φ(α + cHrit)
+cRrit − cL(yit − rit)2
(A.3)
1The range of reviews just needs to be some closed interval on the real line. I have chosen [1, 5] for
consistency with the data.
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Consider four possible examples:
No Costs
If cH = cR = cL = 0, then
∂pi(yit, r˜it)
∂r˜it
= −∂ E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, r˜it]
∂r˜it
Φ(α) < 0⇒ rit = 1 (A.4)
So the best response of every firm is to leave the lowest possible review, which is an
uninformative world. Therefore if there are no costs to leaving a review, firms have an
incentive to completely bias their reviews, and so all reviews will be uninformative.
Infinite Rehire Costs
If cH =∞, cR = cL = 0, then
∂pi(yit, r˜it)
∂r˜it
= −∂ E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, r˜it]
∂r˜it
Φ(α + cHrit)+ (A.5)(
E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, yit]− E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, r˜it]
)
cHφ(α + cHrit) = 0 (A.6)
⇒ rit = yit (A.7)
since a firm will only want to rehire a worker if pi ≥ 0, but a worker will only work again
if they receive a perfect review. So the best response of every firm is to leave an accurate
review, so all reviews are informative.
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Infinite Reputation Costs
If cH = 0, cR =∞, cL = 0, then
∂pi(yit, r˜it)
∂r˜it
= −∂ E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, r˜it]
∂r˜it
Φ(α) + cR ⇒ rit = 5 (A.8)
So the best response of every firm is to leave a perfect review, so all reviews are uninfor-
mative.
Infinite Lying Costs
If cH = cR = 0, cL =∞, then
∂pi(yit, r˜it)
∂r˜it
= −∂ E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, r˜it]
∂r˜it
Φ(α) (A.9)
+2cL
(
E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, yit]− E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, r˜it]
)
= 0 (A.10)
⇒ rit = yit (A.11)
since their is an infinite cost to lying. So the best response of every firm is to leave an
accurate review, so all reviews are informative.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition. In an informative world, the cross-sectional variance of wages increases
with t. In an uninformative world, the variance is constant.
Proof. (Shown for the first review to keep the algebra simple)
In an informative world,
wij1 = E[θi|xi] + ηik1
wij2 = E[θi|xi, ri1] + ηik2
we can express the conditional expectation as a linear function of the conditions:
E[θi|xi] = α1 + β1xi
E[θi|xi, ri1] = α2 + β2xi + λ21ri1
so
V ar(wij1) = (β
1)2V ar(xi) + V ar(ηik1)
V ar(wij2) = (β
2)2V ar(xi) + (λ
2
1)
2V ar(ri1) + 2β
2λ21Cov(xi, ri1) + V ar(ηik2)
therefore
V ar(wij1) = (
Cov(xi, θi)
V ar(xi)
)2V ar(xi) + σ
2
η = Corr(xi, θi)
2V ar(θi) + σ
2
η
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and
V ar(wij2) =
(
V ar(ri1)Cov(xi, θi)− Cov(xi, ri1)Cov(ri1, θi)
V ar(ri1)V ar(xi)− Cov(xi, ri1)2
)2
V ar(xi)
+
(
V ar(xi)Cov(ri1, θi)− Cov(xi, ri1)Cov(xi, θi)
V ar(ri1)V ar(xi)− Cov(xi, ri1)2
)2
V ar(ri1)
+2
(
V ar(ri1)Cov(xi, θi)− Cov(xi, ri1)Cov(ri1, θi)
V ar(ri1)V ar(xi)− Cov(xi, ri1)2
)
(
V ar(xi)Cov(ri1, θi)− Cov(xi, ri1)Cov(xi, θi)
V ar(ri1)V ar(xi)− Cov(xi, ri1)2
)
Cov(xi, ri1)
+σ2η
Simplifying gives
V ar(wij2) =
V ar(θi)
1− Corr(xi, ri1)2
(
Corr(xi, θi)
2 + Corr(ri1, θi)
2−
2Corr(xi, θi)Corr(ri1, θi)Corr(xi, ri1)
)
+ σ2η
so
V ar(wij2)− V ar(wij1)
=
V ar(θi)
1− Corr(xi, ri1)2
(
Corr(xi, θi)
2 + Corr(ri1, θi)
2
−2Corr(xi, θi)Corr(ri1, θi)Corr(xi, ri1)
)
− Corr(xi, θi)2V ar(θi)
=
V ar(θi)
1− Corr(xi, ri1)2
(
Corr(xi, θi)
2 + Corr(ri1, θi)
2
−2Corr(xi, θi)Corr(ri1, θi)Corr(xi, ri1)− Corr(xi, θi)2(1− Corr(xi, ri1)2)
)
=
V ar(θi)
1− Corr(xi, ri1)2
(
Corr(ri1, θi)
2 − 2Corr(xi, θi)Corr(ri1, θi)Corr(xi, ri1)
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+Corr(xi, θi)
2Corr(xi, ri1)
2
)
=
V ar(θi)
1− Corr(xi, ri1)2
(
Corr(ri1, θi)− Corr(xi, θi)Corr(xi, ri1)
)2
> 0
In an uninformative world,
wij1 = E[θi|xi] + ηik1
wij2 = E[θi|xi] + ηik2
so
V ar(wij1) = (β
1)2V ar(xi) + V ar(ηik1)
V ar(wij2) = (β
1)2V ar(xi) + V ar(ηik2)
and
V ar(wij2)− V ar(wij1) = 0
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition. In an informative world, the marginal effect of the observable character-
istic on the conditional mean of wages is strictly positive and decreasing with t. In an
uninformative world, the marginal effect is strictly positive and constant.
Proof.
In an informative world,
wijt+1 = (E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit] + ηikt+1)
∂wijt+1
∂xi
=
∂ E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit]
∂xi
we can express the conditional expectation as a linear function of the conditions:
E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit] = α + βxi + λ1ri1 + ...+ λtrit
so
∂wijt+1
∂xi
= β
where β is the regression coefficient of xi on θi. Since this is increasing in Cov(θi, xi) and
Cov(θi, xi) = γ > 0
therefore
∂wijt+1
∂xi
> 0
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since β is decreasing in the number of positively correlated regressors,
∂2wit+1
∂xi∂t
< 0
In an uninformative world,
wijt+1 = E[θi|xi] + ηijt+1
∂wijt+1
∂r¯it
> 0
∂2wit+1
∂xi∂t
= 0
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition. In an informative world, the marginal effect of the worker’s average review
score on the conditional mean of wages is strictly positive and increasing with t. In an
uninformative world, the marginal effect is zero.
Proof.
In an informative world,
wijt+1 = (E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit] + ηikt+1)
∂wijt+1
∂r¯it
=
∂ E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit]
∂r¯it
we can express the conditional expectation as a linear function of the conditions:
E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit] = α + βxi + λ1ri1 + ...+ λtrit = α + βxi + t(λ1ri1 + ...+ λtrit)
ri1 + ...+ rit
r¯it
so
∂wijt+1
∂r¯it
=
t(λ1ri1 + ...+ λtrit)
ri1 + ...+ rit
where λτ is the regression coefficient of riτ on θi. Since these are all increasing in
Cov(θi, riτ ) and
Cov(θi, riτ ) = Cov(θi, g(yiτ )) = Cov(θi, g(θi + iτ )) > 0
therefore
∂wijt+1
∂r¯it
> 0
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and
∂2wit+1
∂r¯it∂t
=
(λ1ri1 + ...+ λtrit)
ri1 + ...+ rit
> 0
In an uninformative world,
wijt+1 = E[θi|xi] + ηijt+1
∂wijt+1
∂r¯it
= 0
∂2wijt+1
∂r¯it∂t
= 0
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition. In an informative world, the marginal effect of the most recent review on
the conditional mean of the change in the wage is strictly positive and decreasing with t.
In an uninformative world, the marginal effect is zero.
Proof.
In an informative world,
∆wijt+1 = wijt+1 − wikt = E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, rit] + ηijt+1 − (E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1] + ηikt)
∂∆wijt+1
∂rit
=
∂ E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, rit]
∂rit
we can express the conditional expectation as a linear function of the conditions:
E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, rit] = α + βxi + λ1ri1 + ...+ λtrit
so
∂∆wijt+1
∂rit
= λt
where λt is the regression coefficient of rit on θi. Since this is increasing in Cov(θi, rit)
and
Cov(θi, rit) = Cov(θi, g(yit)) = Cov(θi, g(θi + it)) > 0
therefore
∂∆wijt+1
∂rit
> 0
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Since λt is decreasing in the number of positively correlated regressors,
∂2∆wit
∂rit∂t
=
∂λt
∂t
< 0
In an uninformative world,
∆wijt+1 = E[θi|xi] + ηijt+1 − (E[θi|xi] + ηikt)
∂∆wijt+1
∂rit
= 0
∂2∆wijt+1
∂rit∂t
= 0
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition. In an informative world, the marginal effect of the observable characteris-
tic on the conditional mean of the change in the wage is strictly negative and increasing
with t. In an uninformative world, the marginal effect is zero.
Proof.
In an informative world,
∆wijt+1 = wijt+1 − wikt = E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, rit] + ηijt+1 − (E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1] + ηikt)
∂∆wijt+1
∂xit
=
∂(E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, rit]− E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1])
∂xit
we can express the conditional expectations as linear functions of the conditions:
E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1, rit] = αt+1 + βt+1xi + λt+11 ri1 + ...+ λt+1t rit
and
E[θi|xi, ri1, ..., rit−1] = αt + βtxi + λt1ri1 + ...+ λtt−1rit−1
so
∂∆wijt+1
∂xi
= βt+1 − βt
where βτ is the regression coefficient of xi on θi. Since
∂βt
∂xi
> 0
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and
∂2βt
∂xi∂t
< 0
therefore
∂∆wijt+1
∂xi
< 0
and
∂2∆wijt+1
∂xit∂t
> 0
In an uninformative world,
∆wit+1 = E[θi|xi] + ηijt+1 − (E[θi|xi] + ηikt)
∂∆wit+1
∂xi
= 0
∂2∆wit+1
∂xi∂t
= 0
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A.8 Wage Results Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of the choice of cut point, I rerun Equation 2.7 with different
specifications of the variable After. I let the cut point be any of the first ten jobs. If
the cut point is the first job, then the before group is only the first job, and the after
group is all other jobs. If the cut point is the tenth job, then the before group is the
first 10 jobs and the after group is everything else. Figure A.1 show the results. Really
bad reviews have a strong negative effect in the first few jobs, but that effect slowly goes
away. Similarly, the effect of a good review is positive over the first few reviews, and
then decreases over time.
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I also estimate Equation 2.7 allowing experience to be completely non-parametric and
just including dummies for each job number. Figure A.2 plots the coefficients. There is
a clear trend for both a really bad and a good review, although the individual results are
noisy.
Figure A.2: Non-Parametric
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A.9 Time to Job Regressions
Another way to test the informational content of the reviews is to estimate the effect
of the previous review on how long it takes a worker to find another job. If workers who
receive a poor review take longer to find a new job this is evidence that those reviews
are providing information to the market. To do this I estimate the following model:
TimeToJobijt = βReviewTypeit + λXit + µJit + νi + κj + it (A.12)
where TimeToJobijt is the time, in days, between the worker’s previous job and their
new one. ReviewTypeit are indicators for the type of the most recent review, Xit are
worker characteristics, such as education, exam scores, and previous review scores and
Jit are job characteristics, which include indicators for different words that show up in
the job titles. νi and κj are worker and firm fixed effects, respectively. Table A.2 shows
the results. There is robust evidence that a really bad review increases the time between
jobs relative to a bad review and that a good review decreases the time to find a new job.
This is additional evidence that these reviews are providing information to the market.
Interestingly, there does not seem to be a strong effect for receiving no review. Together
with the attrition and wage results, this suggests that workers who receive no review are
leaving the online labor market for reasons beyond just finding another well-paying job.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that workers expect to receive a review and if they
do not, they become disillusioned with the platform and leave.
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Table A.2: Effect of Reviews on the Time to Next Job
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Really Bad Review 7.445∗∗ 5.712∗∗ 5.690∗∗ 5.268∗∗
(1.134) (1.058) (1.595) (1.519)
No Review 3.280∗∗ -0.579 2.180∗ 0.0529
(0.678) (0.645) (1.054) (1.039)
Good Review -4.312∗∗ -3.371∗∗ -5.641∗∗ -4.733∗∗
(0.605) (0.569) (0.935) (0.904)
Worker Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.0105 0.239 0.237 0.440
Number of Workers 21609 19849 20973 18937
Number of Firms 84751 84296 38550 38155
Number of Observations 224177 222417 177976 175553
Note: The omitted review type is Bad Review. Regressions contain controls
for education, country, previous reviews, previous experiences, exam scores
and participation, and job titles. The sample only includes jobs where the
worker works again in the market.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at the
worker level reported in parentheses
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Table A.3: Effect of Reviews on the Probability of Matching
Worker Firm
No Review 0.0786∗∗ 0.0680∗∗
(0.00794) (0.00741)
Really Bad Review 0.0824∗∗ 0.0545∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0117)
Bad Review 0.101∗∗ 0.0801∗∗
(0.00973) (0.00871)
Good Review 0.217∗∗ 0.194∗∗
(0.00626) (0.00597)
Really Bad Review - No Review 0.00384 -0.0135
(0.0160) (0.0137)
Bad Review - Really Bad Review 0.0189 0.0256+
(0.0170) (0.0144)
Good Review - Bad Review 0.116∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0106)
N 6772 6772
Note: The bottom three results show linear combinations of the
coefficients.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered
at the worker level reported in parentheses
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